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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The US 231 William H. Natcher Bridge, spanning the Ohio River near Rockport, IN and Owensboro, KY
was opened on October 21, 2002. The first recorded observations of high density polyethylene (HDPE)
cracking were noted in an annual consultant inspection report dated July 2006. Most of these problems
related to several cables at the tower anchorages that experienced weld cracking of connection sleeve
end fittings, which are termed couplers and reducers in this report.
KTC researchers first observed the cable cracking in May of 2009. By then, extensive cracking
was apparent in the HDPE piping at the deck anchorages. At that time, water found inside the cables
was sampled along with grease and an unknown material, which was later identified as a cementitious
grout. In September 2009, KTC assembled a team of experts that visited the bridge and performed a
preliminary evaluation of the stay cables and conducted initial tests of several nondestructive evaluation
methods. During that work, a cracked weld at a coupler was sectioned, and several pieces of pipe were
removed for laboratory inspection. The laboratory evaluation revealed that the cracking was due to
fatigue from a defective weld (lack of fusion). A sample of black powder removed from the top of the
stay cable piping was identified as coal dust probably from a nearby power plant. A portion of the HDPE
piping made of a thin coextruded white outer layer and a thicker black base layer showed micro-cracking
of the white surface with dark deposits in the cracks (probably coal dust fines).
In 2010, KTC researchers performed follow-on evaluations to detect grout voids inside the HDPE
cables. They used sounding to detect 40 large voids in the upstream cables at the deck anchorages.
Three other nondestructive evaluation methods were successfully demonstrated on the voids including
two hands-on methods, ground penetrating radar (GPR) and time-of-flight ultrasound and one remote
method, infrared thermography (IRT).
In 2011 follow-on work was halted due to construction on a nearby bridge. A five-phase plan
was developed to investigate the cable problem with active work on Phase I of the plan scheduled to
begin in 2012. The first part of the Phase I work began that year. Two consultants, Siva Corrosion
Services (SCS) and KPFF Consulting Engineers (KPFF) were employed to inspect the lower deck
anchorage (SCS) and perform ultrasonic testing on the strand ends.
KPFF performed ultrasonic testing (UT) on each wire in each strand at the deck anchorages
seeking reflections indicative of cracked strands. Most of the strands (86 percent) gave no UT
indications. The remainder, some 429 strands provided “atypical” returns which could be attributable to
corrosion damage (but not cracking). KPFF recommended periodic re-testing of the strands to detect
future degradation”. They identified cables B10D, B15D and C8U as being problematic due to the large
number atypical ultrasonic indications on them.
SCS testing of the protective grease in the anchorage found it to be in poor condition. It was
replaced. SCS also observed a significant amount of water draining from the anchor head areas on 90 of
the 96 stay cables after several days of rain. SCS examined and photographed the anchorages and
performed several tests to assess the wedging of the strands in the anchor heads. SCS also took samples
of the original grease, grout, rainwater and water that drained from the anchor heads and performed
laboratory tests to analyze their impacts on potential corrosion of the strands. The rainwater was the
most problematic issue. SCS recommended Borescoping the voids, evaluating the quality of the grout,
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inspecting the tower anchorages, inspecting strands and repairing the piping to prevent further water
infiltration.
In 2013 KTC conducted the second part of the Phase I work. The first portion of that work was
grout void detection and sizing using GPR testing by KTC, which was supplemented by IRT performed by
the UK Mechanical Engineering Department Institute of Research for Technical Development (IR4TD). GPR
was used to examine the connection sleeves at the reducer ends on the deck anchorages. Once testing
was completed, the grout void sizes were measured by their maximum length along the connection
sleeves. IRT was used to remotely scan the stay cables (from a man-lift) and the tower anchorages (from
the tower work platform). The GPR and IRT results indicated grout voids at all of the deck anchorages in
upper portion of the connect sleeves. The GPR void indications ranged from several to more than 50
inches. GPR and IRT results for the deck anchorages were generally in good agreement. IRT testing of the
tower anchorages indicated grout voids in all of the connection sleeves that were successfully scanned
(65 of 96 cables). Most of those void indications were large.
After that work KTC inspected the deck anchorage piping of all 96 cables. That work included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

performing arm’s length (and closer) inspections of the HDPE piping of the deck anchorages,
accessing the interior of grout voids to assess the internal conditions and determine whether
water was entering the voids,
examining for cracks in the HDPE piping to determine root causes and growth mechanisms,
taking digital pictures of the anchorage assemblies including the connection sleeve assemblies,
exposed portions of the transition pipes and the adjacent portions of the stay pipes,
taking digital pictures of cracking the anchorage piping, measuring crack openings and
classifying the piping issues (i.e., condition states),
taking digital pictures of the tower anchorage HDPE piping using a high resolution camera and
telephoto lens from deck level and the tower platforms,
taking digital pictures of stay pipe ribbing, grout plugs and neoprene boots showing signs of
distress,
evaluating map cracking on the exterior (white) surface of the HDPE piping including conducting
ink penetrant tests around the periphery of the pipes/sleeves, taking digital pictures of the map
cracking and extracting samples of HDPE for laboratory analyses,
performing ultrasonic testing of electrofusion and butt welds,
assessing the chloride content in grout samples extracted from the cables,
placing crack gages on HDPE piping to evaluate potential long-term crack activity, and
repairing or sealing cracks in HDPE piping and replacing HDPE plugs cut out of the connection
sleeves to evaluate the voids.

KTC researchers cut holes near the base of most grout voids and inspected the void interiors
using a videoscope. Inspections revealed that the stay pipes had extended through the voids and
terminated in grout just below the base of the voids. This finding indicated that none of the strands
were directly exposed to the rainwater collecting in the voids. KTC researchers observed water ponding
in 20 of the voids. At several larger voids, the KTC inspection found them completely full of water shortly
after rainfalls. The videoscope revealed signs of water having been present in most of the dry voids. The
presence of water in the voids was typically related to cracks in the HDPE.
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Consultant biennial inspections conducted in 2013 and 2015 found water in some neoprene
boots at the tower anchorages. The number of boots that contained water increased over that period.
Most of the cracking at the deck anchorages occurred in the couplers and reducers located at
the ends of the connection sleeves. KTC researchers found only four stay cables at the deck anchorages
with no cracks. The number of cracks detected by KTC at the deck anchorages increased significantly
between 2009 and 2013.
A crack growth pattern assessment by Applied Technical Services (based upon pictures taken by
KTC researchers) indicated that most of the cracks originated at the top of the HDPE piping transverse to
the longitudinal axis. The cracks radiated circumferentially in both directions until they arrested at the
bottom of the piping. The cables appeared to experience unidirectional bending in the vertical plane.
Cracks in the reducers appeared primarily related to the underlying grout voids and welds issues. The
coupler cracks were primarily related to welds. KTC created a model of the HDPE piping’s condition
states to permit classification of presence/types of cracking into 9 categories. KTC used that to
determine the prevalent types of cracking of the HDPE piping. Ratchet marks on the surfaces of the
cracks indicated that they were probably experiencing low-cycle fatigue.
KTC researchers took high-resolution pictures of the tower anchorages. Those pictures were
used to inspect the HDPE piping at the tower anchorages for cracks. On five stay cables at the tower
anchorages no cracking was observed. At the tower anchorages some cracks possessed wider
openings/gaps than observed at similar cracks at the deck anchorages. Also, several of the tower
anchorages exhibited shear failures in the coupler electrofusion welds and significant slippage between
the connection sleeve couplers and the transition pipes. Summaries of KTC’s inspection work and other
consultants’ findings are provided in Tables 5-8.
KTC researchers documented the disbonding of helically wound ribbing/strakes on the stay
pipes. KTC researchers first observed the ribbing disbonding in 2009. The extent of that damage is
difficult to assess. The ribbing is intended to prevent rain/wind vibrations in the stay cables so its loss
can be problematic.
To detect micro-cracking in the HDPE piping KTC researchers wiped indelible ink marking pens at
90 quadrants around the piping. When multiple ink marks were made on the piping, ink flowed into the
micro-cracks. This produced visible indications of the cracking. In most cases, the micro-cracking was
present with the most severe amount on the upper portion of the HDPE cable components with less –
or no – micro-cracking on the lower surfaces due to higher UV exposure. In some cases, the microcracking appeared to be consistent around the periphery of the HDPE components. KTC researchers
found that all 96 stay cables have surface micro-cracking (map cracking) on at least some of the HDPE
components.
o

Coal fines from a nearby power plant, as well as soils were lodged in the numerous fine cracks,
giving the previously white cables a dingy gray appearance. Some of the HDPE piping, notably the allwhite couplers and reducers did not exhibit this deterioration to the same extent as the coextruded
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white HDPE on the outer surfaces of the stay pipes, connection sleeve pipe segments and the transition
pipes. Since 2009 the stay cables’ change in appearance of the stay cables has become more
pronounced due to the micro-cracking worsening and the uptake of more debris in the cracks. KTC
researchers found the map-cracking extended into the white HDPE. This resulted in the embrittled
material spalling off piping surfaces. KTC researchers provide a test laboratory, Microbac, with samples
of both poor and good performing HDPE from the bridge for evaluation. The laboratory reported poor
oxidation resistance, which indicated that the material was susceptible to UV degradation and not
suitably stabilized for use in exterior exposure. The base black HDPE which comprises most of the piping
thickness had adequate oxidation resistance.
KTC researchers and SCS performed limited maintenance at the deck anchorages. SCS replaced
deteriorated grease on the anchor head and added new gaskets for reinstalling the protective caps. KTC
researchers used several different repairs to seal cracks in the HDPE piping. This included the use of
plastic welding and different sealing materials. The bulk of the cracks were sealed with a UV-resisting
tape. Researchers also placed crack gages at 8 locations where the existing cracks were sealed.
KTC researchers also tested grout samples taken from connection sleeves for chlorides and
determined the chloride-contents were below those specified for post-tensioned grouted strands.
Therefore, chlorides in grout were not considered problematic.
Based upon the Phase I test results, KTC has not identified any concerns that would justify recabling the bridge. KTC originally proposed a five-phase plan to investigate and repair the cables. The
remaining phases need to be carried out to resolve the on-going stay cable problems. The Phase II work
will entail evaluating strands in the piping at or near the deck and tower anchorages for signs of wire
corrosion. The tower anchorages require arm’s length inspections including assessment of connection
sleeves for grout voids and investigating inside those voids. The protective caps at the towers need to be
removed and the anchor heads, wedges and strand tails inspected for corrosion. The Phase II work
should be considered safety inspections. Additionally, UT should be performed on the strands to look for
cracking. The Phase II testing will identify the current conditions of the strands. In Phase III, a consultant
experienced with cable-stayed bridges will perform design and construction reviews, analyze existing
reports on the bridge, perform structural monitoring and other work deemed necessary to identify the
root cause(s) of the stay cable problems. The consultant will also prepare and evaluate options for cable
rehabilitation and replacement. In Phase IV, the consultant will prepare plans for repairing or replacing
the stay cables at the direction of KYTC. Phase V will encompass the rehabilitation project’s
construction.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The US 231 William H. Natcher Bridge, spanning the Ohio River near Rockport, IN and Owensboro, KY
was opened on October 21, 2002 (Figure 1). At that time, it was the longest inland cable-stayed bridge in
the U.S. Currently is the sixth longest bridge of that type. Since the completion of the four-lane section
of US 231 from I-64 in Indiana, the traffic volume over the bridge has gradually increased. Work is
underway to connect the bridge with the William H. Natcher Parkway to I 65. That will create an almost
nonstop route that links I-64 and I-65 allowing traffic using those routes to by-pass Louisville.

Relevant Bridge Features
The main structure of the Natcher Bridge has a conventional two-tower layout employing diamond
shaped pylons that are each 374 feet tall. Its main span is 1,200 feet long with two side spans that each
measure 500 feet (Figure 2). The deck is 67 feet wide (Figure 3). The bridge has 96 stay cables that
terminate at deck and tower anchorages. The stay cables are arranged in harp configurations with 48
cables connecting the deck with each of the pylons/towers on both the upstream and downstream sides
of the bridge. To identify stay cables in this report, the following numbering scheme will be used. First,
the tower or pylon is designated (e.g., Tower B or C). This is followed by the cable number (1-24) and
finally the upstream or downstream side of the bridge (e.g., U or D). For example C11D denotes 11th
cable on Span 10 (the Indiana side span) on the downstream side adjacent to the southbound lanes
(Reference Figure 2).
The stay cables range in length from 170.17 feet to 606.87 feet. The cable diameters range from
5.51 to 8.58 inches. The cables contained between 18 to 61 steel strands (0.6-inch diameter) each of
which contains seven 0.2-inch diameter wires. The strands were fabricated by greasing the wires and
encasing them in polyethylene sheaths. High density polyethylene (HDPE) pipe/sheathing contains the
strands to form the stay cables. Once the cables had been placed, the strands pre-tensioned, and HDPE
piping assembled by welding, the interior of the HDPE piping was filled with a cementitious grout.
According to the designer the HDPE pipes serve several functions:
•
•
•
•
•

Provides additional layer of protection.
Prevents water from entering the cables.
Blocks UV light that can damage the strands sheath.
Provides a smooth aerodynamic shape to the cable.
Acts as a form for grouting (1).

The bridge has similar cable anchorage designs at both deck level and at the towers (Figures 4 and
5). In this system, the stay cable pipe is inserted into one end of a connection sleeve, with a transition
pipe inserted into the other end (Figure 6). At the stay cable end of the connection sleeve, there is a
reduced diameter fitting to accept the stay pipe. The report refers to that fitting as the “reducer”. A
constant diameter fitting is attached to the other end of the connection sleeve to accept the transition
pipe. That fitting is termed the “coupler”. Both of these fittings are butt-welded to the connection
sleeve. Both fittings contain exposed helical wire wrappings on the inside faces that are connected at
each end to external weld nipples. The stay cable pipe and transition pipe are thermally welded to the
connection sleeve couplers and reducers (respectively) in slip fittings using a process termed
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electrofusion welding. In that process, an impressed current is run through the wires from an external
power source attached to the weld nipples. The wires heat the HDPE plastic of the couplers and
reducers causing them to melt locally and subsequently to fuse with the stay pipes and transition pipes,
respectively on cooling. The heating wires are wound along the inner faces of the reducers (in the small
diameter portions) and the couplers so as to create two separate welds running circumferentially and
mate the slip-fitted pieces together. This provides some redundancy if one of the welds fails.
A stay pipe is inserted into the small diameter portion of the reducer (Figure 7). At the end of the
stay pipe there is an end fitting that narrows the diameter of the stay pipe and contains a steel band
that acts as a reinforcement. Inside the connection sleeve, the strands emerge from the stay pipe, splay
slightly and run down the length of the connection sleeve embedded in grout. Near the end of the
connection sleeve, the sheaths are removed from the strands and the bare strands are inserted into
tubes (separation sheaths) inside the transition pipe that run down to the anchor head. These tubes are
wedged in countersunk holes in the anchor heads. The tubes are filled with grease prior to insertion of
the strands to provide corrosion protection. The bare strands are run through the holes in the anchor
head. On the exterior side of the anchor head, those holes are beveled. The strand tails are secured in
tension by wedges inserted into beveled holes in the exterior face of the anchor head. According to the
manufacturer, the anchorage assemblies were supplied with the tube portion pre-grouted to hold the
tubes in place (2). At the anchorages, the strands are continually encased in HDPE starting with the stay
cable, then the connection sleeve and finally the transition pipe (which fits in a notch in the anchor
head). The tower anchorages are a similar to the deck anchorages with shorter connections sleeves and
the guide pipes embedded in the tower concrete (Figure 8).The anchor head is enclosed in a steel
“protection cap” to prevent the strand ends/wedges/and back face of the anchor head from direct
exposure to the atmosphere (Figure 9). Those items are coated with a grease intended to provide
corrosion protection (Figure 10).
The constant section piping, including the stay cables, connection sleeves and transition pipes are
coextruded with a thin outer white layer of HDPE and an inner layer pigmented with carbon black. The
stay piping has helically wound HDPE ribbing attached to the white coextruded HDPE which is intended
to promote the piping shedding water to preclude wind-rain vibration problems (Figure 11). The
couplers and reducers butt welded to the connection sleeve pipes are made from solid white HDPE pipe
and are probably made by injection molding. The transition pipe is made from three pieces: an extruded
pipe of solid carbon black pigmented HDPE, a molded transition piece and a coextruded pipe similar to
the pipe segments of the connection sleeves. The pieces are assembled by butt welding. The only part of
the transition pipe exposed to the atmosphere is a short segment of the coextruded pipe.

Background on Stay Cable Problems
Problems were encountered with stay cables during/shortly after the bridge was constructed. In 2002,
during construction, four strands were found to have experienced wedge slippage involving two cables
(3). A follow-on investigation was performed. This found that most strand ends at the deck anchorages
extended beyond the specified 2-inch length from the anchor plates. The investigators concluded that
three of the strand slippages were probably due to uneven wedge seating. No cause could be ascribed
to the slippage of a fourth strand. The strands were reseated and re-tensioned at the tower anchorages.
The first recorded observations of HDPE cracking that the KTC investigators obtained were
documented in an annual consultant inspection report performed in July 2006 (4). Most of those
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problems related to several cables at the tower anchorages that experienced weld cracking of
connection sleeve couplers and reducers.

KTC Initial Work on the Stay Cables
KTC investigators were apprised of the situation in late 2007 and made their first onsite inspection of
the bridge in May 2009 with KYTC officials from the Central Office and District 2. At that time, KTC
investigators working at the deck level observed numerous cracks in HDPE piping. They took pictures of
all the HDPE deck anchorage piping including magnified images of visible cracks. While at the jobsite,
they worked with KYTC personnel to remove several protective caps and found small amounts of water
in the caps and water leaking from holes in the anchor heads. KTC personnel collected samples of the
water, protective grease and irregularly shaped solid debris found in a protective cap. They also met
with the bridge designer from Parsons Brinkerhoff and showed him the HDPE cracking at the deck
anchorages. He was unable to determine the cause of those cracks.
KTC investigators subsequently took the samples to IMR of Louisville for analyses. The water
was analyzed using energy dispersive spectroscopy. It contained slight amounts of organic acids,
chlorides and nitrates along with a significant amount of sulfates that were later ascribed to calcium
sulfonate in the protective grease. They also reviewed the HDPE piping cracks and categorized the pipes
into nine condition states by the type of piping element affected, the presence of cracking and crack
locations.
In September 2009, KTC assembled at team of UK and outside experts in corrosion, polymers,
plastic welding, modal analysis, failure analysis, ground penetrating radar (GPR) and infrared
thermography (IRT). The group visited the bridge to: familiarize itself with the cracking problems;
conduct some preliminary testing using modal analysis, IRT (with external heating) and GPR; and take an
HDPE fracture sample for follow-on evaluation. At several anchorage locations the reducers had
completely detached from the connection sleeves due to fractures in the butt welds. At those locations
the connection sleeves had deflected transversely relative to the strands which could only be the result
of large voids in the grout. One of the attendees was able to insert a stiff wire into the connection sleeve
at an opening created by the weld fracture and the transverse displacement. The wire was run down the
pipe section about 4 feet. Upon withdrawal, it was found to be wet along most of its length. Both the
GPR and IRT using external heating were unable to detect this large void.
The upper portion of a cracked connection sleeve coupler at cable anchorage B22D containing
the electrofusion weld and a transverse crack was cut for removal (Figures 12, 13). The piece was easily
extracted, which indicated poor electrofusion weld bonding to the transition pipe. Laboratory inspection
of the weld revealed that only a small portion of the heated HDPE had melted resulting in incomplete
fusion (Figure 14). Also, the fracture was due a penny-shaped fatigue crack that grew out of a groove for
the heating wire. It that propagated outward until it became a through-thickness crack. The crack
became unstable and ran completely around the coupler’s circumference (Figure 15). The fatigue
initiation point was on top of the coupler indicating cable deflection in the vertical plane. Those findings
suggested that some of the electrofusion welds were of questionable quality and could be responsible
for some of the (fatigue) cracking observed.
The results of the KTC 2009 work were presented to KYTC officials and a series of laboratory
tests were performed by KTC using GPR with a higher frequency (2.6 GHz) probe than used in the
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previous field tests. Also, IRT was used with ambient thermal response rather than impressed heating.
Both of those tests proved successful and plans moved ahead to employ those in field trials on deck
anchorage piping that were conducted in October 2010. KTC contracted with a nondestructive test firm,
Radarview, to demonstrate the time-of-flight ultrasonic test method that was being used on other
bridges to inspect external prestressing ducts for grout voids. The initial tests centered on several
connection sleeves that had fractured at the reducer butt weld and deflected transversely. As a
comparison, KTC researchers used a 3-pound hammer to strike the outer surface of the HDPE piping and
listened to the resulting sound (Figure 16). The grouted portion of the HDPE piping gave a noticeably
different ring from the void locations where the grout was absent. By rapping the piping at various
location along and around the piping, the boundaries of the voids were detected and marked with
indelible ink pens. The validity of the sounding method was confirmed using the time-of-flight tests
(Figure 17).
As part of the 2010 test, KTC investigators used sounding to examine 40 other connection
sleeves that had cracks in their reducers, but were otherwise intact. Those tests indicated that many of
the connection sleeves had grout voids running from the reducers at various distances into the pipe
sections of the connection sleeves. The presence of those voids and their sizes were verified using both
thermography with pictures taken from deck level using a telephoto lens (Figure 18) and GPR (Figures
19, 20) by running the probe along the connection sleeve (5). It appeared that many of the piping cracks
were associated with the voids under the reducers.
These findings were presented to KYTC officials along with a plan to perform an in-depth
evaluation of the cable piping to assess the damage and defects (grout voids and bad welds) in the stay
piping, along with assessment of the HDPE material/welds to determine if they were satisfactory or
defective (6). Due to construction closure of the KY 161 Bridge at Owensboro, the in-depth work did not
occur in 2011, though KTC researchers visited the bridge to determine traffic needs for that work and,
while there, observed what they believed to be increased cracking on the stay piping at the deck
anchorages. They also developed a five-phase work plan to address the stay cable piping issues and
effect a resolution to them.

2012 Phase I Work
Once the preliminary KTC work was completed and successful void detection methods developed, work
began on Phase I of the five-phase KTC project. Due to funding limitations, the Phase I work was divided
into two parts to be performed in consecutive years. From June to August 2012, KPFF Consulting
Engineers and Siva Corrosion Services (SCS) conducted investigations at the deck/lower anchorages of
the bridge for KTC (Figure 21).
KPFF performed ultrasonic testing (UT) of the strand ends at the anchor heads to inspect as far
up the strands as possible to detect wire fractures (7). KPFF engineers worked at the Dywidag Systems
International laboratory in Bolingbrook, IL to provide a proof of concept for the UT method that was
able to detect half-depth notches in wires in strands at a distance of 9 feet under all loading conditions.
Due to near-field ultrasonic noise, UT could not detect flaws 2 1/2” from the strand end. Concurrent
with that work, SCS removed the protective caps at the deck anchorages and visually inspected the
interior faces of the protective caps, anchor plates, wedges and strand tails for corrosion and strand tails
and wedges for evidence of possible loss of tensioning.
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SCS collected water present at each cable, measured the volume and analyzed it to determine
whether it could contribute to corrosion. SCS also collected rainwater during its time on the bridge.
Additionally, SCS evaluated the anticorrosive grease applied on the anchor plates, strands and wedges
to determine its ability to protect those pieces from corrosion.
The KPFF field work took place during three weeks in July 2012. After removing the protective
caps and anti-corrosive grease, KPFF personnel ground the strand ends flat to provide suitable contact
surfaces for the ultrasonic transducers. During that period KPFF personnel conducted UT tests on all 96
cables – 3053 strands (21371 wires).
KPFF personnel found no flaw indications on 2624 strands (86 percent of the strands). However,
on 429 strands, KPFF personnel detected atypical A-scan returns from one or more wires that might be
typical of corrosion damage (loss of wire section) or some other issue. KPFF found no UT indications
typical for fractured wires. KPFF also noted the “significant” amount of water leaking from the
anchorages after the caps were removed and expressed concerns about corrosion and its possible
impact on the fatigue strength of the strands/wires.
The KPFF recommendations included:
•
•
•
•

Monitoring the stay cables “frequently and closely for degradation.”
Performing further laboratory tests to classify wire damage due to general corrosion (e.g., loss
of section) or small cracks.
Considering the UT data in conjunction with the work done by SCS to evaluate the potential for
corrosion damage (for each cable) for overall analyses of the strands.
Performing in-depth evaluation and future inspections of cables B15D, B10D, C08U and due to
the high number of atypical UT returns encountered from those cables.

SCS performed a detailed visual inspection of all 96 lower cable anchorages and collected and
tested water, grout and grease samples from those anchorages (8). SCS personnel photographed the
sites with the caps in place and removed. They observed the thick deposits of protective grease that
were slathered over the anchorage components and found that the grease was discolored and in need
of replacement. The grease was removed to permit visual inspection of the anchorages. The exposed
steel anchorage components were inspected and photographed. Only light surface rust was observed on
the strands tails, anchor heads and wedges. Conductivity tests were performed between strand tails to
determine if there was excessive corrosion build up between the strands, wedges and bevels in the
anchor heads. The lengths of the strand tails were measured and some variance in the length was
observed. However, that issue was also noted during construction (9). The ends of the strand tails were
sounded with hammer strikes to identify any anomalous responses indicative of loss of pretension.
Water draining from the opened anchorage was collected for future volume measurement and
laboratory analyses. When available, samples of rainwater were collected for laboratory analyses. Grout
found inside the protection caps was taken for laboratory analyses. SCS personnel tried to examine the
backsides of the anchor heads with a borescope inserted through unused holes in the anchor heads.
Those attempts were thwarted by a heavy build-up of the grease on the backsides of the anchor heads.
New grease was obtained and applied to the anchorage components. Also, KTC obtained new flange
gaskets used by SCS to replace the original ones when reinstalling the protective caps.
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Samples were taken to the SCS laboratory for analyses. The laboratory tests of grease samples
indicated that they had mixed with water to form emulsions. SCS noted that the emulsions would not
provide the same corrosion protection as the original grease. The rainwater collected was slightly acidic.
Corrosion rate tests using the rainwater showed that exposed steel wires would corrode rapidly leading
to failure of the strands. SCS noted that on other projects, water infiltrating greased and sheathed
strands (like those used in the Natcher Bridge) had caused strand failure within seven years.
SCS found water in 90 of the 96 deck anchorages. The pH values of the entrained water were
basic due to interaction with the alkaline grout in the cables. In a contact with steel wires the pH values
dropped over time and the cable water samples promoted corrosion similar to that of the rainwater
samples.
SCS recommended:
•
•
•
•
•

•

Performing bore scoping at exposed voids to document the corrosion condition of strands.
Attempting to insert borescope into the top of grease-filled anchorage sections (may not be
completely filled with grease).
Performing intrusive cable inspection at select locations to test grout quality.
Opening/inspecting all upper anchorages.
Opening/inspecting 10 lower anchorages in 2013 to document the condition of strands.
Opening/inspecting these locations again in four years to document the progression of corrosion
and section loss.
Repairing the stay cable pipes to prevent additional water infiltration into the cables.

2. 2013 KTC PHASE I WORK
From June-October 2013, KTC investigators and researchers from the UK Mechanical Engineering
Department Institute of Research for Technical Development (IR4TD) conducted follow-on inspections
of stay piping on the Natcher Bridge. The KTC work included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Detecting and sizing grout voids at the deck anchorages,
Detecting and sizing potential grout voids at the tower anchorages,
Detecting water intrusion/collection in grout voids,
Documenting cracking/flaws in the HDPE piping at the deck and tower anchorages,
Assessing the deterioration on the outer (white) layer of the coextruded and white HDPE piping
at the deck anchorages and lower portions of stay piping,
Assessing electrofusion/butt welds in lower anchorage piping, and
Performing miscellaneous tasks.

GPR and IRT Detection of Grout Voids
Field work began on June 3, 2013. The GPR testing was performed by the KTC Pavements, Materials and
Geotechnical Section and the IRT testing was conducted by the IR4TD team with oversight of the work
managed by the KTC Bridge Preservation Section.
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The GPR testing was performed during June 3 – 7 and 17 – 24, 2013. The testing employed a
Geophysical Survey Systems (GSSI) SIR 3000 data collector and a 2 GHz Palm antenna (Figure 22). The
antenna was moved down the pipe sections of the connection sleeves using the reducer-to-pipe butt
welds as a datum. A void would present from the datum down the pipe sections until it ended (at
varying distances for each anchorage). The distance of the void varied from the top of the cable to the
bottom as the connection sleeves were inclined.
When the fluid grout initially was pumped into the piping at the transition pipe below the
connection sleeve, it did not completely fill the connection sleeves creating the voids. Typically, the
surface of the fluid grout settled to form a horizontal surface and solidified leaving a void that was
longer at the top of the pipe than it was at the bottom (Figure 23).
The pipe was divided into quadrants about its circumference and scans were performed along
the length of the cable at the 3, 6, 9 and 12 o’clock positions. After a scan was completed at a given
position and the end of the void determined the location was marked with an indelible pen and its
length from the datum was measured (Figure 24). Once all the scans had been completed, the
inspection personnel roughed out a border of the void on the outside of the pipe using an ink pen. They
also conducted initial checks of the GPR void locations by sounding them with a hammer. The marked
void boundaries were subsequently used by KTC Bridge Preservation Section personnel in opening the
voids to allow internal inspection. GPR testing revealed grout voids in connection sleeve pipe sections at
all deck anchorages. The GPR void measurements for each cable are provided in Appendix 1 to assist
with future re-grouting operations intended to eliminate the voids.
The IR4TD team performed infrared thermography (IRT) inspections on the cables June 17 – 21,
2013, on the downstream cables and in the towers September 23 – 27, 2013, for the upstream cables
(10). The intent was to perform thermal imaging along the entire length of the HDPE encased cables
from the deck- to the tower anchorages. The team used a portable Long Wave Infrared (LWIR) camera
(FLIR Thermo Vision Model SC660) with a special lens to take the infrared images. The camera had 640 ×
480 pixel resolution and operated in the long-wave infrared region (7.5–13 µm) with a temperature
resolution of 0.1oC. The camera was factory calibrated to measure temperatures between -10 o C – 90 o C
(14o F to 194o F). To ensure successful inspection, the team took IRT images at deck level and at 10, 20
and approximately 50 feet above the deck using a man lift (Figures 25 and 26). IRT images were also
taken from the tower platforms shooting downward at the tower anchorages (Figure 27). The images
were post processed using special software programs to identify defects and construct thermal images
that encompassed the cable’s full length. GPR and sounding location marks for the cable voids were
used as references to compare with the IRT results for the defects (Figure 28).
At the deck anchorages, the thermal imaging detected void indications in all of the connection
sleeves. They were present in the upper portion of the connection sleeves running from the reducer into
the pipe section of the sleeves. IR4TD investigators measured the void sizes non-dimensionally as
percentages of the lengths of the connection sleeve pipe. In the pipe section of the connection sleeve,
defect (i.e. grout void) is identified as an increase in the temperature profile from the surrounding area
of the cable. The defect length is identified as L D in pixels, while the connect sleeve pipe length is
identified as L in pixels (Figures 29 and 30). The defect size (%D) was referred to as dimensionless
percentage and calculated as follows:
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Thermal images taken of the connection sleeve pipe sections at the tower anchorages were
taken on June 20 and 21, 2013 at about 10:00 am CDT. They produced similar results, detecting grout
voids in numerous cables (Figure 31). Researchers encountered problems in imaging all of the
anchorages due to poor visual access to some cables hampering thermal imaging from the tower
platforms. Another problem related to solar reflections which obscured the thermal images from some
cables (Figure 32).
Results of the grout void thermal imaging of the deck anchorage connection sleeve pipe sections
are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The results of the grout void thermal imaging of the tower anchorage
connection sleeve pipe sections are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Both thermal imaging and GPR testing detected grout voids in the deck anchorage connection
sleeve pipe sections of all of the cables except for B13U which was only detected by GPR. Thermal
imaging provided larger void indications than GPR testing though most of the two tests provided
indications within 10 percent of each other. Thermal imaging indicated grout voids in the tower
anchorage connection sleeve pipe sections on all of the cables that were successfully scanned (65 out of
96). Due to lack of physical access to the tower anchorage piping, those indications could not be
confirmed by another test method.
The IR4TD investigators recommended performing additional thermal imaging tests at the
towers to obtain more complete grout void data. The improvements would be realized by using
different lenses and conducting the tests at different times.
Thermal images of the stay pipes only revealed one small void in stay cable B12U (Figure 33).
Thermal imaging did not provide any evidence of voids at the connection sleeve couplers.

Inspection of HDPE Piping Problems
From June 11 to October 14, 2013 KTC Bridge Preservation Section personnel inspected the deck
anchorage HDPE piping of all 96 cables. The work included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

performing arm’s length (and closer) inspections of the HDPE piping of the deck anchorages,
accessing the interior of grout voids to assess internal conditions and determine whether water
was entering the voids,
examining for cracks in the HDPE piping and assessing them to determine root causes and
growth mechanisms,
taking digital pictures of the anchorage assemblies including the connection sleeve assemblies,
exposed portions of the transition pipes and the adjacent portions of the stay pipes,
taking digital pictures of cracking the anchorage piping, measuring crack openings and
classifying the piping issues (i.e., condition states),
taking digital pictures of the tower anchorage HDPE piping using a high-resolution camera and
telephoto lens from deck level and from the tower platforms,
taking digital pictures of stay pipe ribbing, grout plugs and neoprene boots showing signs of
distress,
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•

•
•
•
•

evaluating map cracking on the exterior (white) surface of the HDPE piping including conducting
ink penetrant tests around the periphery of the pipes/sleeves, taking digital pictures of the map
cracking and extracting samples of HDPE for laboratory analyses,
attempting ultrasonic testing of electrofusion and butt welds,
assessing the chloride content in grout samples extracted from the cables,
placing crack gages on HDPE piping to evaluate potential long-term crack activity, and
repairing or sealing cracks in HDPE piping and replacing HDPE plugs cut out of the connection
sleeves to evaluate the voids.

In part, pictures were taken to establish a visual record of the deck anchorage piping condition
in mid-2013 for comparison with previous pictures taken in 2009 and 2010 and for follow-on
comparisons of piping condition in future years.
Evaluation of Grout Voids and the Presence of Water
A major concern of this project was the presence of grout voids in stay cables primarily at the reducer
end of the connection sleeves. Those voids were associated with cracking in the reducers. Another
concern was the presence of standing water in the voids and the possibility of this water coming into
direct contact with exposed strands in the void areas.
Access holes were cut in connection sleeve pipes at the lowest point in the void at each cable as
indicated by the GPR testing. This usually resulted in the access hole being cut at the interface between
the grout and the void. To evaluate the interior of the voids thoroughly, KTC employed an articulating
videoscope inspection camera with sufficient reach (9 feet) to access the interiors of the deck anchorage
grout voids. At every location examined, the stay pipes had penetrated into the connection sleeve pipes
and were visible typically including a portion of the black stay pipe end fittings which were either
partially or completely embedded in the grout (Figure 34). Access holes were not used in a few locations
where GPR and FTIR tests indicated small grout voids (usually 2 to 8 inches long) as most of space inside
the connection sleeves were filled with grout.
The videoscope cable with the camera on its tip was inserted into the access hole and an
operator manipulated the camera by moving the cable in and out and articulating it to view the voids
and search for any signs of distress in the stay cables or the presence of water (Figure 35). Pictures
showed that the set grout had typically formed a flat horizontal surface between the black inner wall of
the connection sleeve pipe and the white exterior wall of the stay pipe (Figure 36). Inside the voids, the
camera revealed void areas between the stay pipes and the inner face of the connection sleeve pipe
which were available to collect and hold any water that could enter the void from cracks in the reducers
or gaps in the reducer electrofusion welds (Figure 37). Pictures taken in the voids with the camera
revealed daylight penetrating through open cracks in the reducers (Figures 38 and 39). In several cases,
the video camera detected drops of water in voids that may be due to condensation (Figure 40). The
videoscope was used on 46 of the downstream and 34 of the upstream stay cables. Of the cables
inspected using the videoscope, about 70 percent showed potential signs of the current/past presence
of water inside the voids (e.g., beach marks on the interior walls of the connection sleeve pipes shown in
Figure 39).
In cutting the access holes for void inspections, KTC personnel encountered water in the voids
on several occasions. A significant amount of water flowed from the 1-1/2 in. diameter access hole
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when inspecting the void at cable B12D (Figure 41). That void had a length of about 26” measured from
the connection sleeve reducer butt weld to the farthest point along the top of the connection sleeve
pipe. KTC personnel videotaped most of this event and it appears that all or most of the void space was
filled with water. At that location, the reducer had a relatively tight circumferential crack (Figure 42).
KTC personnel questioned whether this crack opening was sufficient to allow water into the void and
subsequently considered that the reducer electrofusion weld might have been incomplete letting
moisture to enter the void in the gap between the reducer and the stay pipe. A similar event occurred
when cutting an access hole in the connection sleeve at cable C13U. At cable B3U, KTC researchers
inspected the cable in mid-June 2013. They repaired a relatively tight crack in the reducer using Tedlar
tape. They also cut an access hole near the bottom of the grout void. Due to various operational issues,
they were unable to re-plug that access hole after completing their work. They sealed the grout hole
with Tedlar tape and did not return to permanently close the hole until late September. At that time,
they observed the tape covering the hole bulging outward. When they removed the tape, a large
amount of water gushed from the void (Figure 43). There was no crack-related opening above the void
and the end of the stay pipe was encased in grout. It is likely that the water in the void entered from the
gap between the end of the reducer and the stay pipe. That would indicate that the two electrofusion
welds were not adequately sealing the slip joint between the reducer and stay pipe.
During inspections in the grout voids, KTC researchers encountered water in voids at 20
locations. That water was probably similar to the rain water that SCS found to be acidic and corrosive to
exposed steel strands in laboratory tests.
Crack Inspections/Evaluations
The deck anchorage HDPE piping was visually inspected at arm’s length for the presence of
cracks (Figure 44). Each crack was photographed. Then, the maximum crack openings were measured,
crack tips (where present) were marked and dated and the cracks were categorized by location on the
piping termed “Pipe Condition States“ developed after 2009 KTC inspection. Those nine condition states
are described in Appendix 1. At the deck anchorages all of the cracks were located in the connection
sleeves – primarily in couplers and reducers though some butt-weld cracking extended into the pipe
section of connection sleeves (Figure 45).
In many cases the cracking was circumferential about the pipes and generally perpendicular to
the axis of the piping. In some cases the cracking pattern was relatively complex (Figure 46). In others,
the cracks were simple circumferential transverse cracks (Figure 47). Some cracks began at the top of
the piping and grew around the pipe in both the clockwise and counter-clockwise directions. At some
locations on the bottom side of the reducers or couplers, those cracks merged (Figure 48). In others, the
cracks terminated without merging (Figure 49). At most crack locations, the crack had completely or
almost completely parted the piping elements. Therefore, crack opening/gap measurements were taken
as a measure of crack severity rather than crack length. Large crack openings were measured using a
caliper while tighter cracks were measured using a small crack comparator (Figures 50a and 50b). Crack
gaps were measured at the topmost portion of the piping (0o) and at quadrants numbered clockwise
when looking at a cable from the topside.
At the outer surfaces of the pipes, sawtooth marks were observed on the edges of the cracks
which are indicative of cyclic crack growth (Figure 51). At several locations where the reducer-toconnection sleeve pipe butt weld fractured, the connection sleeve pipe was displaced about 1 inch
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transversely to the reducer end (Figure 52). The large size of crack ratchet marks on the fracture faces
indicate low-cycle fatigue. At several locations, multiple adjacent cracks were evident, which will
probably merge to form a coherent fracture (Figure 53). No fractures showed signs of significant
localized elongation/necking although many had significant gaps between the mating crack faces (Figure
54). The cracking process was on-going during the course of the inspection work. Some crack tips
marked by the consultant conducting a fracture-critical bridge inspection in May 2013 had extended by
the time KTC researchers inspected them in July and October 2013 with some crack growth in excess of
1 inch (Figures 55 and 56). The deck anchorage HDPE pipe conditions are summarized in Tables 5-8.
Subsequent to the KTC field work, Applied Technical Services (ATS) Louisville was engaged to
review the fracture pictures from the deck anchorages and interpret the crack growth patterns. The ATS
report is provided in Appendix 2.
KTC did not have close access to the tower anchorage piping. However, high resolution digital
pictures (4288 x 2848 pixels) were taken at the tower and the deck (3687 x 7311 pixels) of those
locations. Crack information was obtained from viewing those pictures (primarily crack condition states).
Most of the cracking observed at the tower anchorages was similar to that in the deck anchorages, with
nearly all of the cracks in the connection sleeves – primarily in the couplers and reducers (Figure 57). At
the tower anchorages some cracks possessed wider openings/gaps than observed at similar cracks at
the deck anchorages (Figure 58). Also, several of the tower anchorages (B1D and C24D) exhibited shear
failures in the coupler electrofusion welds and significant slippage between the couplers and transition
pipes (Figure 59). That same type of failure had been observed with a lesser amount of slip at several of
the deck anchorages B7U and B12U.
At several of the tower anchorages, lag bolts had been installed as field retrofits to secure
couplers and reducers to transition pipes and stay pipes respectively (indicating that the electrofusion
welds were not adequately joining the HDPE elements). In some cases, the bolts resulted in unusual
crack patterns such as longitudinal cracks (Figure 60). In addition to the digital pictures, other tower
anchorage information (especially related to cracks) was obtained from an annual consultant inspection
report that involved rope descent and hands-on access which enabled direct measurements of crack
openings (11). In some cases, KTC’s review of the digitized pictures conflicted with the findings of that
report. KTC researchers went over those instances closely to resolve the differences. The tower
anchorage HDPE pipe conditions are also summarized in Tables 5-8.
Evaluating the Condition of Other Piping Elements
During the course of KTC’s inspections, the condition of items related to the HDPE piping were photodocumented to determine their condition and assess whether they should be the subject of remedial
actions. Those items included the ribbing/strakes that were attached to the stay pipes, the grout plugs
that were inserted in the stay cables during grouting operations and the neoprene boots that sealed the
opening between the steel guide pipes/girder connections and the transition pipes. No attempt was
made to remove the boot bands and move any boots for internal inspections. That is generally
performed to inspect the neoprene damper between the guide pipe and transition pipe to see if the
dampers are deformed by excessive stay cable vibrations (12). That was not pursued as there had been
no history of severe stay cable vibrations on the bridge and the wind-ties were intact without signs of
major disturbances.
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Short sections on the ends of the stay pipes do not have ribbing as they are slip-fit into the
reducer ends of the connection sleeves and welded to them by the electrofusion welds in the neck of
the reducers. The stay pipes were provided to the jobsite in 40 ft. lengths and butt-welded in the field to
assemble the stay pipes (Figure 61). The sections could be observed as the butt-welding upset the
coextruded stay pipe welds producing visible black bands from the black base HDPE at every weld
location. The ribbing had been shop welded to the stay pipe sections. It was intended to prevent the
formation of water rivulets which could be problematic under certain conditions (e.g., wind-rain
vibrations).
Beginning with the 2009 KTC inspections, failures of ribbing were observed on the stay pipes
(Figure 62). When KTC personnel returned for subsequent inspections, the tangles of loose, detached
ribbing were not visible as they probably had been blown from the stay pipes by the wind. Close
examination of the ribbing at various locations in 2013 indicated that it had been fracturing along its
length and had become detached from the stay pipes (Figures 63-65). The disbonding of the ribbing
appeared to occur randomly throughout the length of all of the stay cables. The extent of ribbing loss is
difficult determine due to the lengths of cable and the distance from which the ribbing must be
observed either at deck level or from the towers. When the ribbing detaches, it leaves remnants of the
weld with the stay pipe making inspection at distance other than arm’s length impractical. To date,
there have been no signs of wind-rain vibration on the bridge. The cross ties were observed to be intact.
Therefore, the impact of lost ribbing is probably not a pressing concern.
The grout plugs appeared to be made from a different material than the HDPE, possibly nylon.
Some of the plugs were generally intact although they showed signs of minor deterioration by cracking
(Figure 66). In most cases the plug cracking is more pronounced (Figure 67). Several grout plugs showed
signs of coming out of the piping and some were missing primarily from stay pipes (Figure 68).
The neoprene boots at the deck anchorages were typically in good condition. One boot showed
signs of what appeared to be minor construction-related damage (Figure 69). All of the stainless steel
retaining bands were in place on the deck anchorage boots. That was not the case at the tower
anchorages where the retaining bands were missing on the tower anchorage boots for cables B13U –
B17U (Figure 70). At that location, the neoprene boots for cables B13U and B17U had slid down the
transition pipes leaving a large gap between the steel guide pipe and the transition pipe (Figure 71).
The consultant inspection noted bulging of some of the tower anchorage neoprene boots along
with leakage of water and other indications of water collecting in the boots (13). Water inside the boots
was noted at 14 anchorages.
Evaluating Map Cracking on the White HDPE Piping
During the 2009 inspections, KTC personnel noted a slight variance of color between some of the
coextruded white HDPE piping (e.g., transition pipes, connection sleeves and stay piping). Most of that
piping, along with the connection sleeve reducers and coupler that were cast from white HDPE had a
bright white appearance. In late 2009, a sample of the white coextruded HDPE that had a darkened
appearance was examined under a, optical microscope revealing that the surface had many fine
interconnected micro-cracks (i.e. map-cracking). The cracks appeared filled with a dark material that was
later found to be, in large part, coal dust fines. The Rockport Power Generating Station (Indiana
Michigan Power Inc.) is a coal-fired power plant has large open piles of coal that come from barges and
railcars (Figure 72). The plant is located in Indiana approximately one mile from the Natcher Bridge and
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the coal piles are located in line of sight of the bridge between the power plant and the river. Wind
carries the dust fines off of the open coal piles. A portion of the fines are deposited on the cables with
some becoming lodged in the micro-cracks. That was determined by sampling surface deposits and SEM
testing in 2010 (14). A white HDPE sample taken from a reducer did not exhibit signs of micro-cracking.
However, by 2013 most of the coextruded piping (and a few of the couplers and reducers) had acquired
a darker grayish appearance (Figure 73).
Prior to their field work, KTC researchers sought to determine why the white HDPE of the
coextruded pipe exhibited micro-cracking while the all-white HDPE of the couplers and reducers were
performing satisfactorily. The probable cause of the micro-cracking was believed to be related to UV
degradation of the HDPE. KTC sought a method to analyze the surface white HDPE for the
presence/absence of UV stabilizers. In 2011, KTC provided FTIR samples of the two types of materials
taken from the bridge in 2009 to an FTIR equipment manufacturer for evaluation. Subsequently, the
firm responded with test results that indicated the presence of “aromatic antioxidant or UV absorbers”
and provided spectra from the two materials that clearly showed peak differences. Based upon that
data, KTC acquired an FTIR unit and made plans to extract thin samples from the stay cables to evaluate
them for the presence of light stabilizers (e.g., hindered amine light stabilizers or HALS).
During work on the bridge in 2010, KTC researchers noticed that darkening of the white HDPE
was most prevalent on the upper portions of the piping. That would be most likely if the micro-cracking
was due to UV exposure which would be greatest on the upper portions of the piping. KTC researchers
wiped indelible ink marking pens at 45o points around the piping with the topmost point marked as 0o
and the bottommost point as 180o. The pipe elements marked included the transition pipes,
connections sleeves (which were categorized as couplers, pipe sections and reducers) and the stay
pipes. When multiple ink marks were made on the piping, the ink flowed into the micro-cracks
producing visible indications of the cracking (Figure 74). In most cases, the micro-cracking was present
as expected with the most severe cases on the upper portion of the HDPE cable components. The lower
surfaces exhibited less (or no) micro-cracking (Figures 75 and 76). In some cases, the micro-cracking
appeared to be consistent around the periphery of the HDPE components. Typically, the all-white
connection sleeve couplers and reducers exhibited little or no micro-cracking (Ref. Figure 77).
Apparently, the process of bonding ribbing to the stay pipes impacted the micro-cracking patterns
adjacent to the ribbing giving some stay pipes a “candy stripped” appearance (Figures 78 and 79). KTC
researchers used a digital microscope/camera to take close-up pictures of the surface micro-cracking
(Figure 80). A magnified image shows the complex interconnected nature of the cracking and the dark
coal/soils lodged in the cracks (Figure 81).
In addition to the ink marking tests, KTC researchers took scrape samples of the HDPE piping
from many stay cables and cable components – transition pipes, stay pipes and connection sleeve
couplers, pipes and reducers (Figure 82). At some locations the white coextruded HDPE on the upper
(0o) portion of the piping had become embrittled, having a powdery consistency. At those locations the
powder had to be removed before the KTC researchers could get down to coherent material that could
be scrape sampled. That underlying material would be extensively micro-cracked. A typical scrape swath
in a micro-crack area usually removed some underlying HDPE that lacked the extensive map-cracking
pattern (Figure 83). The scraping process revealed the interconnectivity of the micro-cracking with
depth (Figure 84). In one case, the micro-cracking in the coextruded HDPE was observed to have
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penetrated down to the black base HDPE (Figure 85). In several locations, the white coextruded HDPE
exhibited spalling (Figure 86).
After completing the field testing and obtaining over 200 slice samples, KTC researchers used
transmission FTIR to produce IR “fingerprints” to the samples (Figures 87 and 88). The red traces are
FTIR scans of the actual test materials, while the blue scans are reference scans of similar materials in an
FTIR scan library. Both sample traces correlate with ones for HDPE in the scan library. They sought to
correlate the surface condition of the HDPE samples with the presence of UV light stabilizers (e.g.,
HALS). They were unable to reproduce the results similar to those provided by the equipment
manufacturer in 2011 and sought assistance from that firm in interpreting the scans. After several
discussions, with their technical experts, that effort was abandoned.
At the direction of KYTC officials, KTC contacted Microbac Laboratories, Inc. of Boulder, CO a
test laboratory familiar with evaluating polymers to assist in evaluating the samples collected. At that
time, KTC researchers had two questions: 1) why do some white HDPE piping components exhibit microcracking and some not?; and 2) does the micro-cracking pose any risk for fracture propagation into (and
through) the black base HDPE? The latter question stemmed from the observation that some of the
micro-cracking had penetrated completely through the white coextruded HDPE down to the black base
material that constituted most of the piping’s wall thickness (Ref. Figure 85). To that end, in 2014, KTC
initially provided the test laboratory with two “chunk” samples of coextruded HDPE with both the white
outer layer and the black base material taken from a cracked coupler on cable B22D in 2011. The
samples had micro-cracking that was less pronounced than that encountered on most coextruded piping
in 2013. KTC also provided 30 slices of the white outer layer of the coextruded piping extracted during
the 2013 field work. Those samples represented good and bad performing white HDPE from both solid
piping (couplers and reducers) and coextruded material. Subsequently, the test laboratory requested
additional “chunk” coextruded pieces from both the topmost and bottommost portions of the piping.
Those were used to perform various laboratory analyses including stress crack testing. The laboratory
test report is attached in Appendix 3.
Various Attendant Tasks and Analyses
In addition to the main tasks described above, KTC conducted several additional tasks as part of the
2013 (and 2014) field work. Those included: attempting ultrasonic testing of electrofusion and butt
welds, assessing the chloride content in grout samples extracted from the cables, placing crack gages on
HDPE piping to evaluate potential long-term crack activity, repairing or sealing cracks in HDPE piping,
measuring resistance in electrofusion weld nipples and replacing HDPE plugs cut out of the connection
sleeves to evaluate the voids.
KTC intended to conduct ultrasonic tests of the piping butt welds and electrofusion welds. The
testing of the butt welds was intended to detect any subsurface cracking that might be forming. The
HDPE piping was being subjected to variable stresses that caused fatigue cracking in the welds. In 2009,
KTC extracted a fractured coupler segment that contained a fatigue crack that initiated at a heating wire
within the electrofusion welds growing from the inside of the coupler to its outer surface before
travelling in both directions around the coupler (Ref. Figure 15). The fracture mechanism of the butt
welds, generally appeared to initiate at or near the top of the piping and grow in visible steps typical of
low-cycle fatigue.
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KTC researchers attempted to perform ultrasonic testing to evaluate the welds. They tried to
acquire sample pieces of butt and electrofusion welds from the stay cable supplier and other sources
but were unsuccessful. KTC researchers avoided removing exemplary welds from the bridge cables for
laboratory ultrasonic tests and the one representative sample extracted in 2009 had been cut up for
other tests . They attempted to perform several field trials using ultrasound but were unable to
interpret the test results. Some straight beam tests of the electrofusion welds for lack of fusion
appeared to be promising, but they could not be interpreted without cutting apart the welds. Lacking
representative sample welds to perform laboratory evaluations (as done by KPFF in evaluating
strand/wire cracking), ultrasonic testing was not going to provide usable results. Therefore, that task
was abandoned.
After cutting the access holes in the connection sleeves at the base of the voids and inspecting
the interior, KTC researchers extracted grout samples prior to plugging the holes. Typically, the grout at
the base of the voids was in a plastic state when being pumped into the interior of the piping. The
topmost portion of the solidified grout was typically covered with porous or flakey small pieces of grout
(Figure 89). Grout specimens were taken from 96 stay cables. Chloride content tests were performed on
10 of those samples using the Germann Rapid Chloride Test that provides results consistent with the
AASHTO T260 Standard Method of Test for Sampling and Testing for Chloride Ion in Concrete and
Concrete Raw Materials. The chloride concentrations ranged from 0.005 to 0.04 percent by weight of
grout. Those values are less than the allowable acid-soluble maximum of 0.08 percent (15).
As part of this work, KTC researchers installed crack width gages bridging cracks in the deck
anchorage piping – the couplers and reducers. The intent was to perform subsequent long-term
monitoring of changes in the gaps of cracks at various cables to determine if the crack widths were
expanding. Previous visual inspections of anchorages by consultants and KTC (from the deck) seemed to
indicate that some crack widths were increasing. The gages were affixed to the HDPE piping on either
side of a crack by screws with the gages aligned along the length of the piping (Figure 90). Ten gages
were installed on both the upstream and downstream stay cables – 5 gages per tower. At some
installations, problems were encountered in attaching the flat-based gages to the round piping which
caused the centering mark on the grids to displace when the tape holding the two gage pieces was cut.
Close-up pictures were taken in those cases for future reference in reading the gages.
KTC researchers applied several types of repairs to the cracked HDPE elements at the deck
anchorages. One type of repair used at three locations involved employing plastic welding to span the
crack gaps. Typically, a drill with a rasp bit was used to cut a bevel along the length of the crack (Figure
91). Then a handheld plastic welder was used weld the cracked pieces together in one pass (Figure 92).
The completed repairs were intended primarily for sealing these pieces and as only one pass was used
with 5/32-inch diameter HDPE welding rods, the repair had low strength (Figure 93). Several months
after one repair was completed, a follow-on inspection revealed that the crack gap had widened and the
weld fractured (Figure 94). Weld repairs were performed at several other locations. After observing that
failure, KTC researchers applied 3MTM Tedlar (polyvinyl fluoride) tape over the plastic welds including
the failed one. A second type of repair used a putty/sealer, STOPAQ® PASTE CZH. The product is a
viscous polymer molding paste with cold-flow and self-healing properties capable of being applied over
polyethylene surfaces. The putty was applied over a crack and subsequently covered with Tedlar tape
(Figures 95 and 96). Several months after the repair, KTC researchers unwrapped the tape to inspect the
putty and found that the crack gap had widened and the putty had failed (Figure 97). The crack was then
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covered with the Tedlar tape. All of the other cracks in the HDPE piping at the deck anchorages were
sealed using the Tedlar tape. At stay cable B2U, the cracks in the reducer above the grout void had been
sealed with tape. An access hole was cut in the connection sleeve at the base of the void (as indicated by
previous GPR testing). Before the grout void could be inspected, KTC researchers had to leave the
bridge. They taped the access hole closed and returned to site several weeks later. They discovered
water a large amount of water the grout void. As the HDPE cracks remained sealed, KTC researchers
believed the water probably entered in the gap between the stay pipe and the reducer (and poor
electrofusion welds). Tape was applied over that gap to prevent water from entering the void (Figure
98). At cable B12D, where water was also present in the grout void, KTC researchers applied STOPAQ®
wrapping tape around the reducer-stay pipe gap (Figure 99). This material remains soft and relatively
pliable. After it was applied, it was overwrapped with Tedlar tape for UV protection. Most of the
reducer-stay pipe gaps were sealed prior to KTC researchers completing their field work. The bulk of the
crack and gap sealing performed on the anchorage HDPE piping consisted of wrappings with Tedlar tape.
Using a voltmeter, KTC researchers performed resistance measurements on the weld nipples of
electrofusion welds on the deck anchorage couplers and reducers (Figure 100). The tests were used to
determine if continuity still existed between the weld nipples. That would indicate the condition of the
weld wiring and indicate if it was damaged. In some cases, broken weld wires were observed at gaps in
cracks at the electrofusion welds – usually along with missing weld nipples (Figure 101). KTC researchers
performed measurements with the potential for future repairs at the electrofusion welds by re-applying
at current and re-melting the HDPE piping. This would be done to repair those welds showing lack of
fusion (e.g., at the reducer-stay pipe gaps) and to re-weld connections showing signs of electrofusion
weld shear failures and modest (< 1 inch) slippage (Ref. Appendix 2 Condition Category 8). The former
task would require using straight-beam ultrasound to identify lack of fusion areas in the existing welds,
which may be possible if KTC can obtain suitable exemplary welds for laboratory testing. Intact
electrofusion welds had resistance reading on the order of a few ohms. Potentially failed electrofusion
welds typically under tight cracks (Ref. Appendix 2 Condition Categories 3 & 6) had resistance readings
in the hundreds to thousands of ohms. Completely failed electrofusion welds showed no continuity
between the weld nipples.
All of the HDPE plugs generated by cutting access holes in the connection sleeves were reattached by plastic welding (Figure 102). At several connection sleeve locations, KTC researchers had
removed 1-inch x 3-inch pieces of HDPE in the coextruded pipe sections to provide samples for Microbac
to analyze in late 2014. They had planned to insert HDPE filler pieces in the holes and close them by
welding. The plastic welding unit malfunctioned during that work. As a stopgap, KTC researchers
inserted the filler piece in the holes, sealed the gaps with caulk and covering the repair with Tedlar tape.
KTC researchers attempted to survey the deck profile but were unable to do so due to a
constant low amplitude vibration in the suspended bridge deck.

3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The US 231 Natcher Bridge contains deficiencies in its stay cable system related to its construction and
materials. It is unknown whether design issues have contributed to these deficiencies. What is
significant is that every stay cable possessed some problem or group of problems that could negatively
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impact – directly or indirectly – the cables’ anticipated service life. These problems could also detract
from the aesthetics of the bridge. The maintenance manual for the bridge notes, “Stay cable corrosion
protection should allow all stay cables to last more than 50 years” (16). The bridge/stay cables have
been in service for 14 years and have experienced distress that may contribute to a reduction of that
anticipated performance. The Phase I inspection results for each component/problem are addressed
below along with their anticipated impacts on future stay cable performance. While these primarily
relate to the stay cables at the deck anchorages, some remote evaluations were performed on the
tower anchorages. This discussion addresses those findings as well. Additional information
needs/actions are also discussed.

KPFF and SCS Investigations
Investigations by others have found that corrosion occurs at anchor heads to varying degrees (17). The
KPFF and SCS investigations of strands and lower anchorages did not reveal any major problems related
to the structural integrity of the cables (e.g., fractured strands). Those investigations provided several
findings that are of major concern. One was the detection of water inside the stay cables. The SCS
inspection discovered water seeping from the bottom anchorages of nearly all stay cables (in various
quantities) after several rain episodes. At that time, the cracks in the HDPE deck anchorage piping had
not been sealed. The protective grease covering the strand tails, wedges and anchor heads was
discolored and found to be less protective than fresh grease. The rainwater samples collected were
shown to cause rapid corrosion in steel wires. The KPFF inspection uncovered a second major concern –
the finding of atypical ultrasonic indications from 14 percent of the strands with a high number of those
from three stay cables – B10D, B15D, C8U and C11U. Based upon their work and experience on other
investigations of cable-stay bridges, SCS and KPFF recommended:
1) Conducting a similar investigation at the tower anchorages including ultrasonic testing of the
strands
2) Determining the condition of strands (and grout) at various locations at the deck and tower
anchorages
3) Keeping water out of the lower anchorage hardware under the protective caps
4) Maintaining corrosion protection (i.e. the protective grease)
5) Performing periodic ultrasonic testing and visual inspections in the deck anchorages (of the
strands and anchor heads/wedges). The need for periodic re-inspections is based upon the
possibility that if wires in a strand have experienced corrosion damage (e.g., pitting) they may
fracture over time due to the interaction of corrosion and fatigue.

Grout Voids
Stay cable shop drawings provided by the stay cable supplier for both the deck and tower anchorages
show the stay pipes terminating in the narrow diameter portion of the reducers where the electrofusion
welds were located. At the deck anchorages, internal inspections of the voids revealed that in most
cases, the stay pipes had extended various distances past that into the connection sleeve pipe sections
(in some cases more than 48 inches past the reducer-connection sleeve pipe butt weld). When access
holes were cut into the base of the voids, the stay pipes ends were found to be embedded in the grout
and in most cases, part of the tension rings at the ends of the stay pipes were partially visible.
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In the stay cable grouting operations, filling plugs were cut in the HDPE transition pipes and
grout was pumped inside travelling down the transition pipe to the anchor heads and upward into the
connection sleeve pipe. KTC researchers believe that when the plastic grout hit the end of the stay
pipe/tension ring, it basically sealed off the stay pipe hole (which was also filled with the greased and
sheathed strands) and began pushing grout up the air pocket in the space between the inner wall of the
connection sleeve pipe and the outer wall of the stay pipe. That created a situation in that space in
which the trapped air was compressed by the plastic grout as it was moving upward filling the cavity in
the compression sleeve. It is presumed that a pressure gage on the grout pump/line indicated a high
pressure which stopped the grouting operation at the transition pipe, causing the grout to incompletely
fill the connection sleeve. Thereafter, the grouting hole was plugged. Subsequently, another grouting
hole was cut in the stay pipe above the reducer and the pumping operation continued with grout
flowing up and down the stay pipe. As the lower end of the stay pipe had been plugged by the first
grouting operation, the grout from the second pumping operation filled the short section of stay pipe
below the pumping hole and routed the rest of the grout up the stay pipe. This operation continued
until the pumping pressure became excessive and a new grouting hole was cut at or above the end point
of the previous grouting operation. Typically, several grout plugs were observed on the bottom sides of
the stay pipes along their length up to the tower anchorages. The FTIR pictures of the tower anchorages
indicated that there were significant grout voids in this case above the reducers inside of the connection
sleeve pipes and probably into the transition pipes. As KTC researchers did not have close access to the
tower anchorages, those grout voids could not be investigated fully and their cause is not known.
Inspecting most of the grout voids was considered necessary because KTC researchers were
concerned that strands might be in contact with standing rain water inside the voids. The SCS report
noted that rain water samples taken in the area were slightly acidic and would cause corrosion in
exposed wires. KTC’s findings indicate that the location where the strands were splayed from the stay
pipes was embedded in grout below the base of the voids. While exposed strands in that location might
be exposed to wet grout, the SCS report noted that water in grout tended to be basic rather than acidic
and would probably not pose a corrosion problem.
At the deck anchorages, grout voids of various sizes were detected in all of the stay cables at the
reducer end of the connection sleeves (see Tables 5-8). Seventy-nine of those detected by GPR were
over 12-inches long as measured from the reducer/connection sleeve pipe butt weld with 28 of those
exceeding a length of 36-inches. Thermal imaging did not detect grout voids at the coupler ends of the
connection sleeves. GPR was not used at those locations although sounding had been used in a limited
number of tests by KTC in 2010, none of which indicated the presence of voids.
At the tower anchorages, thermal imaging void detection was hindered due to several technical
issues. All 65 of the successful thermal images revealed grout voids in the connection sleeve pipes.
Thirty-six of those were greater than 50 percent of the length of the connection sleeve pipes. It is likely
that some of the tower transition pipes are not filled with grout.
The grout voids pose problems related to stay cable integrity. They can contribute indirectly to
wire corrosion and make them more susceptible to cracking. They can also contribute to damage of the
anchorage components (anchor heads and wedges). They directly are a cause of cracking problems in
the stay cable HDPE piping. Any repair actions including those to prevent further cable cracking must
include filling the grout voids at the deck and tower anchorages.
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Water in the Stay Cables
Water inside the stay cables poses a major corrosion threat to the wires. As previously noted, the wires
are inside greased and sheathed strands for most of their length inside the stay cables. Inside the
connection sleeves, the strands splay out where they exit the stay pipes and travel down the connection
sleeve pipes. Fortunately, the grout voids were above those locations and no uncovered strands were
directly exposed to rainwater inside the grout voids.
KTC researchers found large amounts of standing water in voids at three stay cables and the
presence of water in 20 of the voids that they inspected. Videoscope inspections revealed indications
that water had been present inside dry voids of many of the stay cables. The indications typically were
tide marks on the inner walls of the connection sleeve pipes. The absence of water in more voids during
the inspections was probably due to a lack of rain prior to that work. SCS personnel collected water
discharges from most of the anchor heads after the protective caps were removed for their inspections.
In some cases, the collected large amounts of water after several days of rain. That water probably came
from four potential locations: 1) down the stay pipes from cracks in the HDPE piping at the tower
anchorages, 2) through the reducer-stay pipe gaps, 3) through cracks in the couplers and reducers, and
4) leakage at the neoprene boots. For cases 1-3, grout voids function as containers that collect the rain
water before gradually releasing it downward through the transition pipe and through gaps and holes in
the anchor heads. If the voids were not present, much less water could enter the piping.
For the water in the voids to reach the anchor heads, it had to penetrate through the about 10
feet of grout inside the connection sleeve and transition pipes. If the water penetrated at the neoprene
boots, it would run down the steel guide pipes and enter the anchor head area through various joints in
the HDPE anchorage piping or mating surfaces in the steel anchorage components. The former case
poses questions about the continuity and permeability of the grout inside the deck anchorages. The
latter case can be evaluated by removing a neoprene boot shortly after a rain event and checking for
water inside the steel guide pipe.
The 2013 consultant inspection report noted the presence of water in the neoprene boots at the
tower anchorages at 14 locations (Figure 103). A recent 2015 consultant inspection found that the
number of boots with water had increased to 29 (18). SCS personnel have observed a similar problem on
a cable-stayed bridge in another state (19). It is likely due to either leakage where the boot laps the
guide pipe or to porosity in the boot material. The large gaps in some HDPE piping at the tower
anchorages lead to water vapor entering the upper portions of anchorages inside the connection sleeves
and condensing. The SCS report noted that some deck anchorage anchor heads had open holes that,
according to the plans, should have been stopped by rubber plugs. They may also be missing from the
tower anchor heads. Moisture from condensation could cause corrosion at the anchor heads.
Water in the cables is related to breaches in the HDPE piping at cracks and probably incomplete
electrofusion welds in the reducers. It may also result from a lack of water-tightness in the neoprene
boots. Any repairs to the stay cables must eliminate the presence of water inside the cables.

Cracking of the HDPE Piping
Cracking of the HDPE piping occurred almost entirely at the connection sleeve reducers and couplers.
Over time, the number of those components with visible cracking has increased significantly and the
crack openings have increased at some locations. In other cases, existing cracks have grown in length.
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Consultant inspections performed in 2011 and 2013 showed new cracking or changes in cracks in 15
tower anchorages and 11 of the deck anchorages. KTC researchers performed deck-level inspections of
the deck anchorages in 2009 and the arm’s length inspections addressed in this report in 2013. In 2009,
they observed 26 stay cables with no cracking. The 2013 inspection found that only four cables had not
cracked. Most of the cracks found during the 2013 KTC inspection would be readily observable from
deck level.
Based upon the ATS assessment of crack growth patterns, it appears that the cable movements
were primarily unidirectional in the vertical plane (Appendix 2). There has been no evidence that the
cables were subject to unusual or extreme motions (e.g., rain/wind induced vibrations). Cracks usually
formed on the top side of the cables and propagated downward on either side. ATS noted that the buttweld fractures originated in the heat affected zones of the welds. Some of the cracks appear to be
related to fatigue in the electrofusion welds which may be due to lack of fusion between the slip-fit
pieces. Those cracks would grow from the inner face of the piping through the thickness of the pipe
component and then travel around the periphery from both edges of the through-thickness crack. At
the bottom of the pipe, the clockwise and counter-clockwise moving cracks would usually intersect,
move to the edges of a component (for the couplers) or overlap each other and stop growing. In some
cases, the cracks had not yet quit growing and crack tip markers placed several months apart showed
significant growth. Since most of the HDPE cracking was in the solid white couplers and reducers, ATS
recommended extracting specimens from them and subjecting the specimens to tensile and impact
tests to determine if their mechanical properties were satisfactory.
In the case of the deck anchorage reducers, grout voids appear to be a major factor. Tabatabai
proposed that the solidification of the grout at an angle at the base of the voids created an uneven
transfer of stresses from the strands to the reducers. That results in the connection sleeves bending in
the vertical plane when the cables are stressed either by traffic or thermal loading (20). That would
create a negative moment on the piping in the void area and promote cracking at the top of the pipes
(Figure 104). Measurements of crack gaps on the tops and bottoms of the piping (the 0o and 180o
positions respectively) showed no size tendency at either location on the cracked reducers. Several deck
connection sleeves with long grout voids – C4U, C19D and C20D – developed complete fractures at the
reducer – connection sleeve pipe butt-welds. The reducers remained attached to the stay pipes while
the connection sleeve pipe was displaced transversely (cracking condition state 4). The voids may have
been localized areas where the cables had greater flexibility due the lack of grout and acted as stress
concentrators that also promoted cracking. As previously noted, the visible ratcheting marks on the
cracks indicated that the growing cracks experienced low-cycle fatigue probably due to thermal stresses.
As previously discussed there were some shear failures of the electrofusion welds with
significant displacements of the separated stay pipes and reducers at the tower anchorages. At the time
of construction, slippage of electrofusion welds at those locations must have been a concern as lag bolts
were installed adjacent to some of those welds to prevent further shear failures and joint slippages.
Review of KTC’s high-resolution tower pictures showed that some retrofit locations had cracking
associated with the lag bolts and the continued integrity of those joints is in question.
Based on KTC arms-length inspections at the deck anchorages, the consultant biennial
inspection report of 2013, and review of KTC’s high resolution pictures of the tower anchorages the
cracking conditions for the HDPE piping at the deck and tower anchorages were as follows:
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• No stay cable HDPE piping is without cracks at both the deck and tower anchorages
• No cracking was observed in the HDPE stay pipes
• 5 stay cables have intact HDPE piping at the deck anchorages
• 3 stay cables have intact HDPE piping at the tower anchorages
At the deck anchorages, the most common crack condition states were:
• Type 1 (69)
• Type 2 (23)
• Type 3 (20)
At the tower anchorages, the most common crack condition states were:
• Type 2 (52)
• Type 3 (31)
• Type 6 (11)
As previously noted, KTC researchers used crack openings (gaps) as a measure of severity. For
the deck anchorages the following crack opening data were collected (representing the maximum crack
openings):
• < 0.125 inches (41)
• 0.125 inches – 0.500 inches (80)
• > 0.500 inches (0)
Using the consultant biennial inspection report and high resolution pictures, the crack openings at the
tower the following crack opening data was collected:
• < 0.125 inches (27)
• 0.125 inches – 0.500 inches (65)
• 0.500 inches – 0.750 inches (7)
• > 0.750 inches (4)
The fact that the crack openings at the tower anchorages were greater than those at the deck
anchorages may relate to gravity and downward slippage of the pipes. What is interesting is that some
of the cracks at the deck anchorages had large gaps. That indicates the HDPE piping is in tension.
Generally, the crack openings at the deck anchorages were greater at the reducers than at the couplers
which might be explained by the presence of the grout voids, but some couplers had crack openings as
wide as the ones in the reducers.
One interesting point to note is that KTC and others inspecting the Natcher Bridge stay cables
did not find any signs of cracking in the stay pipes. The presence of tensile stresses and alternating
stresses has not proven problematic in the longest portions of the cables. That indicates the cracking
problems may mostly be related to grout voids and improper welds at the anchorages. The implication is
that the cracking repairs will only need to be affected at the stay cable ends.
The recent 2015 consultant inspection report for the Natcher Bridge revealed continued HDPE
piping crack activity in the form of new cracks emerging, growth of existing cracks around the piping and
widening of crack openings. The report indicated that new crack activity was observed in over 30
locations in both tower and deck anchorages. The consultant’s evaluations of crack activity at the deck
anchorages were hampered by KTC researchers taping over cracks in 2013.
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The cracks in the HDPE piping require repair, but before that is done, a better understanding of
why the cracking occurs is necessary. The cracking is on-going and any repairs that are proposed must
arrest or compensate for it. Key actions to address the cracking problem include assessing cyclic cable
stresses due to loading and thermal stresses, reviewing construction practices for the installation of
cables/piping, and reviewing the structural design. It should be noted that the cable supplier had
minimal involvement with cable installation on this bridge (21).

Micro-Cracking of the White HDPE
All 96 stay cables have micro-cracking on at least some their HDPE components. The HDPE specimens
provided to Microbac for laboratory testing were subjected to constituent analysis (Thermal Desorption
Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry or TD GC/MS), (High Performance Liquid Chromatography or
HPLC), UV performance (Oxidative Induction Time or OIT testing) and mechanical testing (the
Pennsylvania Edge Notch Test or PENT).
The TD GC/MS testing was performed by several methods to seek the common UV stabilizer
additives used in polymers – hindered amine light stabilizers or HALS). Thermal Desorption Gas
Chromatography is a process whereby a polymer sample is heated producing volatiles or semivolatiles
that are transferred into a GC column in a carrier gas stream. The volatiles are separated as compounds
in the GC column and each volatile is subjected to analysis as to the amount and type of chemicals
present in the sample. That test was used to evaluate white HDPE from both solid and coextruded
samples at various depths.
The HPLC testing is similar to TD/GC MS. The testing was used to determine the antioxidant (AO)
concentration of the white coextruded layer of the chunk HDPE samples from connection sleeves
removed in 2014. The AO concentration is a measure of UV resistance of the white HDPE.
OIT testing measures the level of thermal stabilization of the material tested. The test uses an
instrument having a chamber in which a polymer is melted in an inert gas atmosphere. The liquid
polymer is then exposed to an oxygen atmosphere. When the liquid polymer begins to oxidize, it gives
off heat. The instrument detects the temperature increase. The interval between the exposure of
oxygen to the liquid polymer and the onset of the exothermic reaction is termed the Oxidative Induction
Time (in minutes). The test is a measure of the polymer’s resistance to oxidation with better UV
resistance resulting in longer OITs. That test was used to evaluate white HDPE from both solid and
coextruded samples at various depths.
The PENT test was used to test the stress crack resistance/slow crack growth resistance. In that
test, the chunk specimens extracted from connection sleeves (top and bottom) in 2014. Those were
given a single edge notch and placed in a chamber filled with heated air. The specimen was placed in a
constant load fixture with a timer that recorder when the pre-notched specimens broke into two pieces
(in hours). The longer time to failure was indicative of better crack resistance.
The Microbac report findings are summarized as follows:

22

“Based on the cumulative body of test results reported herein, one can conclude the
following:
1. The white coextruded material (and/or white base material for those samples not
manufactured via coextrusion) displays evidence of UV exposure-induced
degradation (via outdoor weathering) as evidenced by Map Cracking, which has
occurred within approximately ten years of service.
2. The white coextruded material (and/or white base material for those samples not
manufactured via coextrusion) displays very poor oxidation resistance as
evidenced by very low OIT test results, although some few examples of higher OIT
performance are in evidence.
3. The white coextruded material appears to NOT contain any HALS, which would be
the typical additive used to stabilize white (non-black) PE materials used in
outdoor service applications.
4. The white coextruded material contains varying levels of antioxidants (AO), from
poorly-stabilized to well-stabilized.
5. The black pipe sheathing base material displays adequate to good oxidation
resistance as evidenced by OIT test results from 19 to 56 minutes.
6. The black pipe sheathing base material displays varying levels of stress crack
resistance (SCR) performance, from less well-performing (22-39 hours) to wellperforming (>1000 hours).
The cumulative high-level takeaways from this testing program would be:
7. In general the white coextruded (or otherwise manufactured) material is NOT
suitably stabilized for use within an outdoor service environment.
8. It is surmised that multiple different white materials were used in the
manufacture of the products used within the stay cable protection system.
9. It is surmised that multiple different black materials were used in the manufacture
of the products used within the stay cable protection system.
10. Through wall fractures initiating in the compromised white coextruded layer may
arrest in the black material, with higher probability of this occurring for those
black base materials with well-performing SCR (i.e. >1000 hours).
11. It should be noted that some system components, specifically the molded
couplers and reducers, display acceptable field performance (i.e. they do NOT
show map cracking and related weathering), although the materials test data
contained herein would indicate the presence of oxidative degradation. No
explanation is offered to explain this inconsistency.”
The report indicates that the white HDPE material is generally susceptible to oxidation (UV damage). The
2013 KTC inspection revealed that some pairs of connection sleeves (e.g., B3D and B3U) had little or no
signs of micro-cracking while most of the others did. The white co-extruded HDPE of the stay pipes,
transition pipes and connection sleeve pipes seems more prone to micro-cracking than the all-white
HDPE couplers and reducers. The reason for that difference could not be deduced from the Microbac
test results. Based upon the Microbac findings, it is likely that even the HDPE components that KTC
researchers considered as performing well in 2013 will eventually exhibit micro-cracking.
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Insight into the performance of the white co-extruded HDPE material can be gained in reviewing
a certificate of performance from the material supplier (22). The supplier subjected samples of the coextruded piping to an accelerated weathering test (Xenotest 1200) for 10,000 hours. The supplier noted
that this was equivalent to 10 years of service. That testing produced “micro-fissures” (e.g., microcracks) that were at a maximum of 10 percent of the co-extruded material thickness (2 mm). As of 2013,
the Natcher Bridge had been in service for 12 years. The micro-cracks in the co-extruded material
exceeded the amount predicted by the supplier. At one scrape test location KTC researchers observed
that the micro-cracking had penetrated down to the black base material of a transition pipe (Ref. Figure
84).
KTC researchers did not perform measurements on how deeply of the micro-cracks penetrated
into the white co-extruded layers of the piping. The white co-extruded HDPE has become embrittled and
is beginning to spall from the surface of some of the piping. The rate of that deterioration has not been
determined. In 2013 this was not widespread. Eventually, it is anticipated that the white co-extruded
HDPE will dissipate leaving the black base HDPE exposed to UV attack. The Microbac report stated that
the percentage of carbon black in the base HDPE was sufficient to give it long term UV resistance.
Another concern of KTC researchers is the possibility that the micro-cracking might reflect into the black
base material, especially since the HDPE was subject to live stresses and some of the micro-cracks
appeared aligned perpendicularly to those stresses. The Microbac report concluded that the black base
material taken from the connection sleeves had a range of stress crack performance. That may require
investigation in the future. The difference between the supplier’s test results and the HDPE performance
at the bridge is that the supplier’s test likely did not reflect all of the environmental factors present in
the field (e.g., freezing and thawing). In 2014 the Post-Tensioning Institute considered rigorous UV
exposure testing for HDPE pipes than used to qualify the Natcher Bridge material (and the US 62/68
Harsha Bridge at Maysville).
Recognition of the Natcher Bridge micro-cracking relates to the darkening of the stay cables due
to coal dust and soil build-up in the micro-cracks. If that had not occurred, the micro-cracks probably
would have not been detected for several more years until spalling became more pervasive. For several
years, KTC researchers questioned why the US 62/68 Harsha Bridge that was constructed a year before
the Natcher Bridge did not show similar stay cable discoloration (noting the KTC had not performed
close inspections of the Harsha Bridge stay cables). In 2014, the white HDPE cables on the Harsha Bridge
began showing signs of darkening. It is likely that the Harsha Bridge had the same rate of micro-cracking
as the Natcher Bridge, but lacked a nearby major source of airborne fines to become trapped and
discolor the stay cables.
Eventually, KYTC may consider applying a wrap over the co-extruded cable to prevent further UV
damage and accommodate any potential stay pipe cracking that might occur after the on-going cracking
problem has been addressed. Prior to the development of the coextrusion process, Tedlar tape was
commonly used for wrapping black-pigmented HDPE stay cable piping. That material may be considered
for use in wrapping the cables. In 2009, a proprietary cable wrap was applied as a spot repair to a
connection sleeve where a piping sample was extracted (B22D). When that repair was inspected in
2013, it was performing well (Figure 105). Another firm markets a similar wrap that acts as ribbing in
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breaking up water rivulets to prevent rain/wind vibration. Those materials may be considered if the
Cabinet eventually decides to wrap the stay cables.

Results of Various KTC Tasks
KTC employed/attempted miscellaneous tasks as part of the 2012/2013 Phase I field work. Some of
those tasks should be expanded either on the deck or tower anchorages or both. SCS and KTC
performed remedial work on the stay cables at the deck anchorages during the course of the Phase I
work. SCS replaced water-contaminated grease on the anchor heads, strand tails and wedges and
replaced damaged gaskets on the protective caps. KTC sealed all of the cracks on the deck anchorage
HDPE piping and also sealed the reducer-stay pipe gaps to eliminate the most likely sources of water
from entering the voids. KTC also provided several types of repairs including plastic welding of cracks.
Follow-on inspections of those repairs can provide insight into future repair options. The bridge
maintenance manual prescribed the used of welding to repair damaged HDPE (23). KTC employed
single-pass welds in an effort to seal the cracks. A crack repair using welding and another using a putty
sealer both failed in a few months. Future repairs using plastic welding would need to be multiple-pass
welds after beveling the HDPE cracks. The root cause of the cracking must be identified and addressed
before welding can be relied upon the re-join the broken pieces. However, it is the opinion of KTC
researchers that plastic weld repairs are not likely to remain intact under the current conditions
impacting the bridge cables.
KTC did not repair cracks/breaches in the HDPE piping at the tower anchorages. A temporary
repair of those locations should be performed in the near future after the condition of exposed strands
at has been determined.
The crack gages KTC installed provide some insight about continuing crack growth in the stay
cable piping. The gages can be applied over cracks sealed by taping enabling inspectors to identify
subsequent changes in crack openings while preventing water from entering the pipe openings.
KTC researchers sought to identify the condition of the electrofusion welds by performing
resistance readings at the weld nipples and attempting to evaluate the welds internally using ultrasonic
testing. The resistance readings were performed successfully. KTC has retained those readings and they
can be provided in the event that future weld repairs can be affected by re-melting the existing welds.
The latter action was hampered by lack of exemplary samples for laboratory calibration of an acceptable
ultrasonic test procedure. As past efforts to obtain those samples proved unsuccessful, it is unlikely that
the nondestructive testing can be used. Repair of the electrofusion welds may be of limited benefit as
many of those are cracked, the heating wires are broken in some instances and show high resistance in
others.
The Natcher Bridge grout samples taken by KTC researchers were sufficient to measure the
chloride contents, but not thoroughly characterize the material. Grout properties can affect corrosion
susceptibility even with low chloride contents (24). If the greased and sheathed strands are intact, the
grout properties will probably not impact strand corrosion susceptibility. Grout condition probably is a
factor of concern at the anchorages where damaged or otherwise pervious grout may allow moisture in
the cables to cause corrosion problems in the anchor head area.
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Stay Cable Problem Issues and Priorities for Follow-on Work
The KTC Phase I work has not identified any concerns that would justify re-cabling the bridge. A series of
actions focusing on specific concerns and actions to assess their severity or remediate them are
presented. Most of this work can be completed over the next few years. The original KTC plan
envisioned a five-phase project of which the Phase I work is complete. KTC researchers believe that plan
is still viable though the timeframe has expanded due to various factors. Phase II includes evaluation of
the tower anchorages and the strands. Phase III entails an in-depth consultant review of the
construction work/sequence impacting the cables, a design review of the bridge, reviews of relevant
reports and documents, possible instrumentation of the bridge and data analysis, review of the current
condition of the stay cables and development of a report that identifies the root causes of stay cable
problems, proposing a repair procedure and evaluating options for repair or replacement of the cables.
Phase IV would involve a consultant preparing plans to either repair or replace the stay cables at the
direction of KYTC. Phase V is the construction phase of the rehabilitation project.
The highest priority task is the assessment of the strands’ condition. KTC/KPFF/SCS findings
warrant additional work to evaluate the condition of the strands at various locations in the stay
cables/anchorages. If the strand sheaths show no signs of distress (e.g., cracking, rust staining, bulging)
the strands can be considered intact. Evaluation of strand condition is a safety issue. If corrosion has
damaged the wires inside strands, they can fail eventually due to fatigue even if the corrosion process is
arrested.
For assessing strand integrity at the deck level anchorages, KTC has identified 11 cables that are
candidates for assessing strands inside the HPDE piping. The selection criteria were:
• KTC and SCS detection of water inside the piping/anchorages,
• Cracking condition states 4, 7 and 8,
• Cracks in reducers and couplers with openings > 0.25 inches, and
• The number of anomalous UT returns (KPFF) > 15 percent.
KPFF requested in-depth inspections of stay cables B10D, B15D, C8U, and C11U due to a high number of
anomalous UT returns and those were included in the final list of stay cables for strand inspections. Two
other stay cables B2U and B12D were included due to the large quantities of water encountered in their
grout voids. The 11 stay cables selected for strand inspection at the deck anchorages are: B10D, B12D,
B15D, C10D, C20D, B2U, B19U, C8U, C11U, C18U and C23U.
Additionally, the integrity of the strands at each of the tower anchorages needs to be
determined after “hands-on” inspections of the anchorage piping. This would include visual inspections
of strands exposed by pipe cracking. Inspection of strands enclosed inside the tower HDPE piping will be
performed after determining the presence or absence of grout (e.g., grout voids), the presence or
absence of water inside those voids determined, and video scoping of the interiors of any grout voids.
Also, the strand ends at the towers need to be tested using ultrasound to detect potential distress (i.e.
cracks or anomalous/atypical UT returns). Thereafter, strands inside the tower piping can be accessed
and evaluated.
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The work at the towers and the strand assessments must be completed before performing any
remedial tasks on the bridge. The only additional task would be to temporarily repair cracks and gaps in
the deck and tower anchorage piping to prevent the entry of water inside the stay cables to provide
short-term protection while KYTC is considering/implementing more permanent actions.
An in-depth study is needed to determine the root cause(s) of the on-going HDPE pipe cracking.
That study should also provide a detailed plan to halt the HDPE piping cracking, execute repairs to the
fractured HDPE pipe components along with any other necessary revisions to the bridge, and provide an
inspection procedure to address future concerns about stay cable strand integrity. The latter task would
address current performance of Natcher Bridge stay cables not anticipated in previous guidance
documents (25, 26). All HDPE piping cracks at the deck and tower anchorages need to be temporarily
sealed until they are permanently repaired.
The micro-cracking and subsequent spalling of the white coextruded HDPE piping requires
investigation the rate of deterioration. Beyond aesthetics, the micro-cracking may reflect into the black
HDPE base material at some locations and cause the pipe to crack away from welds. That possibility
requires attention at some point. The ribbing/strakes are becoming embrittled, cracking and detaching
from the stay pipes. The impact of their loss on the rain/wind susceptibility of the stay cables needs to
be evaluated at some point. Eventually, the HDPE piping may be wrapped to deal with the UV
degradation and possibly restore the rain/wind strake function. However, it would be beneficial to wait
several years after the HDPE cracking repairs have been made to determine if those are effective.
The condition of neoprene boots at both the deck and tower anchorages requires further study.
Some had physical damage (cuts, gouges) or were improperly mounted. The cause of moisture in the
boots at the tower anchorages may relate to leakage at the boot seams, loss of material water
resistance or water entering the boot from the gap between the transition and guide pipes. Internal
inspection of the tower anchorages at the anchor heads may provide insight into the latter possibility.
The water-tightness of the deck anchorage boots needs to be evaluated by internal inspections in the
space between the transition and guide pipes as well. The implications/consequences of water in the
boots has not been assessed. One piece zip-up neoprene sleeves are available to replace boots that are
damaged or leaking (Figure 106). The existing neoprene boots can also be painted with a protective
coating (e.g., hypalon) to seal them from water and reduce weathering.
The work described above will take several years to complete. Most of the problems
encountered on the Natcher Bridge appear to be unique to or at least first identified on this bridge as
the result of the Phase I work. Other stay cable bridges have experienced significant strand deterioration
that hopefully has not occurred on this bridge. Additional work will be needed to ascertain that fact.
Follow-on repairs, both temporary and permanent, will be needed to prevent strand damage that could
prove problematic to the long-term structural integrity of the stay cables.
It should be noted that the first cable-stayed bridge built in the continental U.S., the I-310 Hale
Boggs Memorial Bridge, at Luling, LA opened in 1983 was the subject of various investigations
throughout its service life. A KTC researcher participated in one of those in the late 1980s. In 2007, the
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decision was made to re-cable the bridge due to wire corrosion and other issues. That work ran from
2009-2012 and cost $30.5 million.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following detailed tasks should be performed in the sequence described to address the stay cable
problems:
1. Perform tasks on the HDPE piping at all of the deck anchorages including evaluations of the joint
repairs/crack-sealing work performed by KTC in 2013, affecting necessary repairs to those
locations and the new cracks that have appeared. Tape over white-coextruded HDPE sites where
KTC took scrape samples and weld HDPE filler pieces where KTC took test samples in late 2014.
It is estimated that this field work will take 2-3 weeks.
2. At 11 stay cables, cut into HDPE piping at the deck anchorages connection sleeves (below grout
voids) and inspect the condition of several strands embedded in grout. On four stay cables, cut
the stay pipe HDPE and inspect the condition of several strands embedded in grout.
3. Concurrent with Task 2, establish temporary arm’s length access to the tower anchorages.
Inspect any strands exposed by cracking/gaps in the HDPE piping. Thereafter perform temporary
repairs to the damaged piping by wrapping crack openings/gaps with Tedlar tape. Sound the
connection sleeves to detect grout voids. Cut access holes – as necessary – in the grout voids
and videoscope inside the voids to assess strands for exposure to water. Inside the towers,
remove the protective caps and access the anchor heads, wedges and strand tails. Evaluate
those for corrosion and slippage. Grind the strand tails flat and perform UT on each wire noting
strands with anomalous UT indications. Based on findings of the tower work, cut the HDPE
piping – as necessary – to access strands inside the connection sleeves and transition pipes to
evaluate their condition. Determine the cause and consequence of the tower voids filling with
water. Completion of Tasks 2 and 3 will complete Phase II of the KTC plan to address the stay
cable problems.
4. Concurrent with Tasks 2 and 3, engage a consultant familiar with cable-stayed bridges to
investigate the initial design and construction of the cables, identify the root cause(s) of the stay
cable piping cracking, evaluate the current strand conditions, propose repairs and evaluate the
options of repairing or replacing the stay cables. Phase III of the KTC plan will encompass this
task.
5. After addressing Task 4, the consultant will prepare plans to either repair the existing cables or
to replace them at option of KYTC. This task will is Phase IV of the KTC plan.
6. Let a contract to rehabilitate the Natcher Bridge cables based upon the recommendations of the
consultant. This will address Phase V of the KTC plan.
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Table 1. Dimensionless Defect (Grout Void) Sizing on Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeve Pipe
Sections Based Upon Thermal Imaging for Tower B (Op. Cit. 10, p 20).
Upstream
Downstream
Cable Number
Defect Size
Cable Number
Defect Size
B1U
13%
B1D
40%
B2U
21%
B2D
47%
B3U
24%
B3D
33%
B4U
45%
B4D
31%
B5U
33%
B5D
32%
B6U
24%
B6D
30%
B7U
17%
B7D
21%
B8U
8%
B8D
7%
B9U
14%
B9D
17%
B10U
16%
B10D
17%
B11U
22%
B11D
35%
B12U
12%
B12D
21%
B13U
2%
B13D
26%
B14U
40%
B14D
30%
B15U
21%
B15D
22%
B16U
23%
B16D
24%
B17U
19%
B17D
18%
B18U
23%
B18D
37%
B19U
15%
B19D
32%
B20U
14%
B20D
25%
B21U
15%
B21D
27%
B22U
29%
B22D
25%
B23U
35%
B23D
31%
B24U
40%
B24D
15%
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Table 2. Dimensionless Defect (Grout Void) Sizing on Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeve Pipe
Sections Based Upon Thermal Imaging for Tower C (Op. Cit. 10, p 20).
Upstream
Downstream
Cable Number
Defect Size
Cable Number
Defect Size
C1U
27%
C1D
38%
C2U
24%
C2D
30%
C3U
29%
C3D
38%
C4U
38%
C4D
9%
C5U
38%
C5D
10%
C6U
29%
C6D
30%
C7U
20%
C7D
23%
C8U
26%
C8D
29%
C9U
28%
C9D
32%
C10U
18%
C10D
17%
C11U
21%
C11D
21%
C12U
7%
C12D
23%
C13U
9%
C13D
1%
C14U
9%
C14D
9%
C15U
31%
C15D
26%
C16U
9%
C16D
9%
C17U
31%
C17D
12%
C18U
37%
C18D
32%
C19U
34%
C19D
30%
C20U
26%
C20D
44%
C21U
44%
C21D
37%
C22U
38%
C22D
32%
C23U
27%
C23D
13%
C24U
34%
C24D
20%
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Table 3 Dimensionless Grout Void Sizes for Upstream and Downstream Tower Anchorage
Connection Sleeves in Tower B (Op. Cit. 10, p. 26).
Upstream
Downstream
Cable Number
Defect Size
Cable Number
Defect Size
B1U
B1D
B2U
B2D
B3U
B3D
B4U
43%
B4D
85%
B5U
47%
B5D
73%
B6U
77%
B6D
20%
B7U
75%
B7D
73%
B8U
60%
B8D
93%
B9U
65%
B9D
67%
B10U
56%
B10D
55%
B11U
60%
B11D
23%
B12U
B12D
B13U
B13D
B14U
26%
B14D
35%
B15U
40%
B15D
40%
B16U
35%
B16D
64%
B17U
100%
B17D
10%
B18U
50%
B18D
10%
B19U
30%
B19D
20%
B20U
57%
B20D
43%
B21U
57%
B21D
58%
B22U
45%
B22D
71%
B23U
B23D
B24U
B24D
Note: No readings obtained in red cells. Results obscured by shading (blue cells) and solar reflections
(yellow cells).
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Table 4 Dimensionless Grout Void Sizes for Upstream and Downstream Tower Anchorage
Connection Sleeves in Tower C (Op. Cit. 10, p. 27).
Upstream
Downstream
Cable Number
Defect Size
Cable Number
Defect Size
C1U
C1D
C2U
C2D
C3U
C3D
C4U
10%
C4D
75%
C5U
10%
C5D
75%
C6U
60%
C6D
10%
C7U
88%
C7D
73%
C8U
86%
C8D
97%
C9U
64%
C9D
64%
C10U
65%
C10D
55%
C11U
C11D
23%
C12U
C12D
C13U
C13D
C14U
41%
C14D
35%
C15U
48%
C15D
25%
C16U
15%
C16D
34%
C17U
42%
C17D
45%
C18U
85%
C18D
68%
C19U
66%
C19D
15%
C20U
45%
C20D
75%
C21U
C21D
80%
C22U
C22D
73%
C23U
C23D
C24U
C24D
Note: No readings obtained in red cells. Results obscured by shading (blue cells) and solar reflections
(yellow cells).
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Downstream Side (Span 9 Cables 13-24 and Span 8 Cables 1-12)
Tower B

Cable

IR4TD Tower
Anchorage Void
Size as
Determined by
Thermography

B1D
B2D*
B3D
B4D
B5D
B6D
B7D*
B8D
B9D
B10D*
B11D
B12D
B13D
B14D
B15D*
B16D
B17D
B18D*
B19D
B20D*
B21D
B22D
B23D*
B24D

N/A
N/A
N/A
85%
73%
20%
73%
93%
67%
55%
23%
N/A
N/A
35%
40%
64%
10%
10%
20%
43%
58%
71%
N/A
N/A

*

KTC Tower
Anchorage Crack
Condition States and
Burgess & Niple
Crack Gap
Measurements
(inches)
8
0
3
2
2
3
3
6,2
6
2
2
3
6,2
6
3
2
2,3
3
3,2
2
0
6,2
3
3

= Crack Monitor installed
= Tower Anchorage
= Deck Anchorage

#
0.000
0.125
0.813
0.813
0.063
0.063
0.250,0.063
0.250
0.563
0.375
0.125
.063,.063
0.375
0.188
0.250
HL,0.250
HL
HL,0.063
0.375
0
0.500,0.063
0.125
0.125

N/A
#
HL

KTC Deck
Anchorage
Void
Measured at
0ᵒ (inches)

IR4TD Deck
Anchorage
Void Size as
Determined by
Thermography

49.25
48.75
37.00
41.25
39.25
33.25
22.50
3.00
16.00
14.00
38.50
23.50
24.50
32.50
21.25
18.00
16.75
7.50
31.50
26.00
30.00
24.00
34.00
1.75

40%
47%
33%
31%
32%
30%
21%
7%
17%
17%
35%
21%
26%
30%
22%
24%
18%
37%
32%
25%
27%
25%
31%
15%

KTC Deck Anchorage
Crack Condition States
and Crack Gap
Measurements (inches)
1
1
1
2
2,5
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1,6
2,5
1
1
1,6
0

0.240
0.368
0.030
0.150
0.165, 0.010
0.243
0.267
0.075
0.295
0.213
HL
0.070
0.125
0.090
0.172
0.275
0.165
0.090
0.175, 0.030
0.230, 0.050
0.277
0.226
0.060, 0.030
0.000

KTC Water
in Void
(Deck
Anchorage)

SCS Water in
Anchorage
(Deck
Anchorage)
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

KPFF UT
Indications
Typical/Atypical
(Deck
Anchorage)
36/4
32/7
49/10
25/5
28/6
29/3
23/7
22/6
25/1
18/6
17/1
21/4
22/3
16/2
17/7
20/5
24/3
23/6
27/5
26/8
28/8
36/3
32/6
44/7

= Cables not imaged
= Measurement not taken
= Hairline Crack (< 0.004)

Table 5. Summary of Stay Cable Conditions for Deck and Tower Anchorages of Tower B Downstream from KTC and Various Consultant
Inspections.
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10%
18%
17%
17%
18%
9%
23%
21%
4%
25%
6%
16%
12%
11%
29%
20%
11%
21%
16%
14%
22%
8%
16%
14%

Upstream Side (Span 9 Cables 13-24 and Span 8 Cables 1-12)
Tower B

Cable

IR4TD Tower
Anchorage
Void Size as
Determined by
Thermography

B1U
B2U
B3U
B4U
B5U*
B6U
B7U
B8U
B9U*
B10U
B11U*
B12U
B13U
B14U
B15U
B16U
B17U*
B18U
B19U*
B20U
B21U
B22U
B23U*
B24U

N/A
N/A
N/A
43%
47%
77%
75%
60%
65%
56%
60%
N/A
N/A
26%
40%
35%
100%
50%
30%
57%
57%
45%
N/A
N/A

*

KTC Tower
Anchorage Crack
Condition States and
Burgess & Niple
Crack Gap
Measurements
(inches)
6
3,8
3,8
3,8
2
2,5
3
3
3
3
3,5
2,3
5,2,1
2,3
2,3
5,3
3
5,2
6,2
0
0
2,5
0
2

= Crack Monitor installed
= Tower Anchorage
= Deck Anchorage

0.313
#
#
0.125
0.250
0.250, 0.375
0.125
0.250
0.125
0.250
0.125, 0.375
0.063, 0.375
0.250, 0.063
0.063, 0.750
0.25, #
0.125, 0.125
HL
0.188, 0.063
0.313, 0.125
#
0.000
0.375, 0.063
0.000
0.125

N/A
#
HL

KTC Deck
Anchorage
Void
Measured at
0ᵒ (inches)

IR4TD Deck
Anchorage
Void Size as
Determined by
Thermography

5.25
40.50
28.00
50.00
39.75
29.75
18.25
4.25
14.00
18.00
26.50
7.50
0.00
38.00
21.50
26.25
18.75
46.50
15.50
11.75
11.75
38.25
39.25
52.00

13%
21%
24%
45%
33%
24%
17%
8%
14%
16%
22%
12%
2%
40%
21%
23%
19%
23%
15%
14%
15%
29%
35%
40%

KTC Deck Anchorage
Crack Condition
States and Crack Gap
Measurements
(inches)
1
1
1
2,6
2
2
2,8
1
2
1
2
8
0
0
1
1
1,6
1,6
2,6
1,6
1,6,7
1,5
1,6
1

0.060
0.100
0.100
0.375, 0.080
0.223
0.245
0.080
0.080
0.245
0.275
0.339
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.390
0.390
0.246, 0.004
0.246, 0.004
0.332, .0125
0.481, 0.217
.220, .218,
0.224, 0.291
0.300, 0.128
0.255

KTC Water
in Void
(Deck
Anchorage)

SCS Water in
Anchorage
(Deck
Anchorage)

X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

KPFF UT Indications
Typical/Atypical
(Deck Anchorage)

33/7
36/4
51/8
30/0
34/0
31/1
26/4
21/7
23/3
20/4
14/4
22/2
20/5
16/2
24/0
23/2
25/2
22/7
30/2
31/3
31/5
35/4
32/6
43/8

18%
10%
14%
0%
0%
3%
13%
25%
12%
17%
22%
8%
20%
11%
0%
8%
7%
24%
6%
9%
14%
10%
16%
16%

= Cables not imaged
= Measurement not taken
= Hairline Crack (< 0.004)

Table6. Summary of Stay Cable Conditions for Deck and Tower Anchorages of Tower B Downstream from KTC and Various Consultant
Inspections.
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Downstream Side (Span 9 Cables 13-24 and Span 10 Cables 1-12)
Tower C

Cable

IR4TD Tower
Anchorage Void
Size as
Determined by
Thermography

C1D
C2D
C3D*
C4D
C5D
C6D
C7D
C8D
C9D
C10D*
C11D
C12D
C13D
C14D
C15D*
C16D*
C17D
C18D
C19D
C20D
C21D
C22D*
C23D
C24D

N/A
N/A
N/A
75%
75%
10%
73%
97%
64%
55%
23%
N/A
N/A
35%
25%
34%
45%
68%
15%
75%
80%
73%
N/A
N/A

*

KTC Tower
Anchorage Crack
Condition States and
Burgess & Niple
Crack Gap
Measurements
(inches)
8
3
3
2
2
1
2
2
2,3
2
2
2,3
6,2,3
2
2
3
2
2
2
6,3
3
5
5
8

= Crack Monitor installed
= Tower Anchorage
= Deck Anchorage

0.25
0.125
0.063
0.313
0.438
0.250
0.188
0.125
0.063, 0.250
0.375
0.125
0.063, 0.125
0.063, 0.125, #
0.125
0.250
0.250
0.250
0.250
0.750
1.75, #
1.750
0.375
0.500
0.250

N/A
#
HL

KTC Deck
Anchorage
Void
Measured at
0ᵒ (inches)

IR4TD Deck
Anchorage
Void Size as
Determined by
Thermography

38.0
31.5
38.5
8.5
38.5
30.5
22.0
35.0
34.0
16.0
21.8
14.8
2.0
4.0
28.5
6.0
4.0
32.0
30.0
59.0
43.5
37.8
7.0
22.5

38%
30%
38%
9%
10%
30%
23%
29%
32%
17%
21%
23%
1%
9%
26%
9%
12%
32%
30%
44%
37%
32%
13%
20%

KTC Deck Anchorage
Crack Condition
States and KTC Crack
Gap Measurements
(inches)
1,8
1
1
1,5
1,5
1
1
1,6
1
1,6
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
4
4
1,6
1
1
1

0.229
0.293
0.143
0.100, 0.121
0.080, 0.060
0.202
0.215
0.211, 0.020
0.151
0.144, 0.020
0.095
0.120
0.040
0.000
0.050
0.030
0.004
0.080
#
#
0.090, 0.061
0.060
0.050
0.216

KTC Water in
Void (Deck
Anchorage)

X
X
X

X

SCS Water in
Anchorage
(Deck
Anchorage)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

KPFF UT
Indications
Typical/Atypical
(Deck Anchorage)
31/9
30/9
49/10
24/6
29/5
28/4
29/1
24/4
23/3
23/2
18/0
23/2
23/2
16/2
22/2
22/3
24/3
25/4
26/6
31/3
30/6
30/9
32/6
43/8

23%
23%
17%
20%
15%
13%
3%
14%
12%
8%
0%
8%
8%
11%
8%
12%
11%
14%
19%
9%
17%
23%
16%
16%

= Cables not imaged
= Measurement not taken
= Hairline Crack (< 0.004)

Table 7. Summary of Stay Cable Conditions for Deck and Tower Anchorages of Tower C Downstream from KTC and Various Consultant
Inspections.
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Upstream Side (Northbound Side)
Tower C

Cable

IR4TD Tower
Anchorage
Void Size as
Determined by
Thermography

C1U
C2U
C3U
C4U
C5U*
C6U*
C7U*
C8U
C9U
C10U
C11U
C12U
C13U
C14U
C15U
C16U
C17U
C18U*
C19U
C20U
C21U*
C22U
C23U
C24U

N/A
N/A
N/A
10%
10%
60%
88%
86%
64%
65%
N/A
N/A
N/A
41%
48%
15%
42%
85%
66%
45%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

*

KTC Tower
Anchorage Crack
Condition States and
Burgess & Niple
Crack Gap
Measurements
(inches)
5
5,3
2
2
2
6,2
2
2
2,5
3,2
2
2,3
2,3
2
6,3
2
2
3
5,2
5,2
2,3
6
6,2
2,3

= Crack Monitor installed
= Tower Anchorage
= Deck Anchorage

0.250
.25,.25
0.188
0.375
0.500
0.375, 0.063
0.500
0.375
0.125, #
HL, 0.188
0.375
0.125, #
0.063, #
0.063
0.063, 0.063
0.125
0.125
0.063
0.250, 0.125
N/A
.125, 0.1875
#
0.250, #
0.125, #

N/A
#
HL

KTC Deck
Anchorage
Void
Measured at
0ᵒ (inches)

IR4TD Deck
Anchorage
Void Size as
Determined by
Thermography

55.5
31.5
42.0
51.5
46.8
32.8
23.0
32.5
31.8
19.0
26.8
22.3
26.8
4.0
28.3
4.5
27.8
33.5
36.5
25.8
47.3
40.0
42.0
35.8

27%
24%
29%
38%
38%
29%
20%
26%
28%
18%
21%
7%
9%
9%
31%
9%
31%
37%
34%
26%
44%
38%
27%
34%

KTC Deck Anchorage
Crack Condition
States and Crack Gap
Measurements
(inches)
1
1,6
1
4
2
2,6
1
1
1,6
1
2,5
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
2,6
2,5
1,6
1
1,6
1

0.294
0.218, 0.392
0.170
#
0.280
0.302, 0.273
0.289
0.234
0.244, 0.050
0.208
0.260, 0.067
0.179
0.130
0.070
0.166
0.080
0.274
0.362
0.310, 0.375
0.310, 0.375
0.388, 0.208
0.222
0.294, 0.210
0.240

KTC Water in
Void (Deck
Anchorage)

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

SCS Water in
Anchorage
(Deck
Anchorage)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

KPFF UT
Indications
Typical/Atypical
(Deck Anchorage)
33/7
32/7
54/5
25/5
28/6
28/4
29/1
18/10
20/6
21/3
13/5
23/2
24/1
14/4
21/3
20/5
21/6
24/5
30/2
27/7
33/3
35/4
33/5
50/1

18%
18%
8%
17%
18%
13%
3%
36%
23%
13%
28%
8%
4%
22%
13%
20%
22%
17%
6%
21%
8%
10%
13%
2%

= Cables not imaged
= Measurement not taken
= Hairline Crack (< 0.004)

Table 8. Summary of Stay Cable Conditions for Deck and Tower Anchorages of Tower C Upstream from KTC and Various Consultant Inspections.
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7. FIGURES

Figure 1. US 231 William H. Natcher Bridge over the Ohio River near Owensboro, KY and Rockport, IN.

40

Figure 2. Cable configuration for the Natcher Bridge (Symmetrical for Upstream and Downstream).

Figure 3. Cross-section of Natcher Bridge Deck on Main and Side Suspended Spans.
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Figure 4. Deck Anchorages.

Figure 5. Tower Anchorage.
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Figure 6. Tower Anchorage and HDPE Piping Terminology.

Figure 7. Deck Anchorage Sectional View Showing Key Components (VSL).
43

Figure 8. Tower Anchorage Sectional View Showing Key Components (VSL).

Figure 9. Protective Cap on Deck Anchorage during Removal.

44

Figure 10. Deck Anchorage Showing Heavy Grease Coating on Strands/Wedges/Anchor Head. Note Water inside
Anchorage Piping being Collected
.

Figure 11. Helically Wound Ribbing on Stay Pipes.
45

Figure 12. Crack in Connection Sleeve Coupler at Cable B22D. Note Inked Cutting Outline.

Figure 13. Connection Sleeve and Coupler after Coupon Extraction. Note Grout (Red Arrow) and the Transition Pipe
(Blue Arrow).
46

Figure 14. Extracted Coupon (Inner View). Note Fracture Face (Red Arrow) and Lack of Fusion Area in Electrofusion
Weld (Blue Arrow).

Figure 15. Fatigue Fracture Surfaces. Note Concentric Beach Marks in Top View.
47

Figure 16. Locating Voids in Deck Anchorage Piping Using Sounding (October 2010).

Figure 17. Locating Voids in Deck Anchorage Piping Using the Time-of-Flight Method
(October 2010).
48

Figure 18. UK IR4TD Personnel Taking IR Pictures of the Deck Anchorage Piping (October 2010).

Figure 19. KTC Personnel Using GPR to Locate Voids in Deck Anchorage Piping (October 2010).
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Figure 20. Grout Void Indication on GPR Monitor Screen.

Figure 21. Deck Anchorage Sectional View Showing Strand Wedge Anchor.
50

Figure 22. Detecting Grout Voids in Connection Sleeves by GPR using a GSSI Palm Antenna.

Figure 23. Sectional View of Grout Void Disposition in Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeves.
51

Figure 24. Measuring Grout Voids Based upon GPR and Sounding Tests.

Figure 25. Use of a Man Lift to Take Thermal Images of the Stay Cable Piping at Various Heights above Deck Level
(Op. Cit. 10, p. 11).
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Figure 26. Camera Operator Taking Thermal Images of the Stay Cables from a Man Lift.

Figure 27. Camera Operator Taking Thermal Images of Anchorages at the Tower Decks.
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Figure 28. Images of Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeve of Cable B5U Infrared (Thermal) Image (a) Showing Void
under Connection Sleeve Piping Compared to (b) GPR Detected Defect Shown in Visual Image (Op. Cit. 10, p. 17).

Figure 29. Example of Defect Analysis for the Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeve of Cable B1D. Image Taken a Deck
Level Position 0 (Op. Cit. 10, p. 13).
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Figure 30. Infrared Images of Deck Anchorage at C6U. Afternoon Imaging was Performed at 4:50 pm CDST (Top Left)
While the Morning Imaging was done at 10:50 am (Top Right). Non-dimensional Temperature of the Dashed Lines
Show a Distinction between the Void and Grout-Filled Areas inside the Connection Sleeve Pipe in the Both Morning
and Afternoon Sessions (Op. Cit. 10, p. 18).
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Figure 31. Infrared Image of the Tower Anchorage Connection Sleeve Pipe Section for Cable B3D and Thermal Profile
for the Dashed Line Shown in the Infrared Image (Op. Cit. 10, p. 24).
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Figure 32. Thermal Image Taken at Tower B of Cables B20D-B22D Showing the Effect of Solar Reflectance in
Inhibiting Detection of Grout Voids (Op. Cit. 10, p. 88).

Figure 33. Thermal Image of Stay Pipe at Cable B12U Showing Possible Void (Op. Cit. 10, p. 28).
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Stay Pipe

Stay Pipe
End Fitting

Top of Grout
Figure 34. View from Hole Cut in Connection Sleeve Pipe. Grout Void Area Showing
Stay Pipe End Fitting Embedded in Top of Grout.

Figure 35. KTC Technician Operating the Articulating Camera of Videoscope inside a Grout Void in a Connection
Sleeve.
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Figure 36. Grout Interface between the Inner Wall of the Connection Sleeve Pipe and the Stay Pipe.

Figure 37. Picture Taken by Videoscope inside a Grout Void Looking Upward Where the Stay Pipe Passes Through
the Reducer.
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Figure 38. Picture Taken by Videoscope Showing a Reducer Crack inside a Grout Void.

Figure 39. Picture of a Grout Void Taken Upward with Daylight Visible Through a Crack in the Reducer. Note the Tide
Mark Rings on the Inner Wall of the Connection Sleeve Indicating Past Presence of Water in the Cable.
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Figure 40. Picture inside a Grout Void Showing the Presence of Water in a Grout Void.

Figure 41. Water Leaking from a Grout Void in the Connection Sleeve Pipe at Stay Cable B12D.
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Figure 42. Circumferential Crack in Reducer above Grout Void in Stay Cable B12D.

Figure 43. Water Gushing from Void in Cable B2U after Tape Covering Hole was Removed.
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Figure 44. Arm’s Length Crack Inspection of the HDPE Piping at the Deck Anchorages.

Figure 45. Crack Growth from Coupler Butt Weld into Connection Sleeve Pipe Section (Looking Downward).
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Figure 46. Complex Condition State 6 Cracking – A Single Crack at the Top of the Pipe Which Grew Radially in both
the Clockwise and Counter-clockwise Direction to the Bottom of a Coupler (Looking Upward).

Figure 47. Simple Condition State 3 Cracking Perpendicular to Axis of Piping.

64

Figure 48. Bottom Side of HDPE Reducer Where Cracks Growing Clockwise and Counter-Clockwise from the Top Side
Merge.

Figure 49. Bottom Side of HDPE Reducer Where Cracks Growing Clockwise and Counter-Clockwise from the Top Side
Terminate.
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Figure 50. (a) Measuring Large Crack Opening with a Vernier Caliper; (b) Measuring Small Crack Opening with
a Comparator Gage.

Figure 51. Sawtooth Edge of Fatigue Crack with Arrow Pointing in the Direction of Propagation.
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Figure 52. Fracture Surface Marks (Steps) Indicating Clockwise (Right- to- Left) Crack Growth Typical of Low-Cycle
Fatigue Crack Propagation at Reducer-to-Connection Sleeve Pipe Butt Weld.

Figure 53. Individual Crack Sites That Merge to Create Stepped Crack Faces.
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Figure 54. Large Crack Opening without Signs of Significant HDPE Deformation.

Figure 55. Crack Growth in Reducer Indicated by Marks (5/13 – Consultant and 7/13 – KTC).
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Figure 56. Crack Growth in Connection Sleeve Pipe Indicated by Marks (5/13 – Consultant and 10/13 – KTC).

Figure 57. Coupler Crack at Tower Anchorage on Cable B1U.
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Figure 58. Cables B4D and B5D at Tower Anchorage Showing Gaps Created by Butt Weld Fracture between Reducers
and Pipe Sections of Connection Sleeves.

Figure 59. Slippage of Coupler off Transition Pipe at Tower Anchorage B4D due to Shear Failure of Electrofusion
Welds.
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Figure 60. Longitudinal Cracking of Reducer at Lag Bolt Retrofit Added During Construction.
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40 ft.

Figure 61. Typical 40 ft. Stay Pipe Segment with Helical Ribbing Intact.
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Figure 62. Severe Disbonding of Ribbing from Stay Pipe Segment (2009).
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Figure 63. Cracking of Ribbing Still Bonded to Stay Pipe (2013).

Figure 64. Ribbing Detaching from Stay Pipe near Deck Anchorage
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Figure 65. Ribbing Detaching from Stay Pipe near Tower Anchorage (2013).

Figure 66. Grout Plug with Minor Cracking.

75

Figure 67. Grout Plug in Transition Pipe Having Extensive Cracking.

Figure 68. Missing Grout Plug.
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Figure 69. Neoprene Boot at Deck Anchorage with Superficial Damage.

Figure 70. Neoprene Boots at the Upstream Side (Span 9) of Tower B Showing Missing Boot Retaining Bands.
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Figure 71. Detached Neoprene Boot at Tower Anchorage of Stay Cable B13U.

Figure 72. Barges Off-Loading Coal at the Neighboring Rockport Power Station in Indiana.
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Figure 73. Contrasting Appearance of the Stay Cable HDPE Piping between 2009 and 2013.

Figure 74. Penetrant Test Showing Indelible Ink Bleeding into Micro-cracks at the Topmost Portion of a Stay Pipe.
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Figure 75. Ink Marks around the Periphery of Stay Pipe B2U Pipe Showing Ink Bleeding into Micro-cracks at the Mid
Portion of the Pipe (Upper Arrow) and No Bleeding Is Present on the Lower Portions (Lower Arrow).

o

180

Figure 76. Close up Picture of Ink Marks on the Bottom Side of the Connection Sleeve at B20U Showing Signs of
Minor Micro-cracking (Ink Bleeding).
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Figure 77. Ink Mark on Coupler Showing the Absence of In Bleeding/Micro-cracking.

Figure 78. Differences in Micro-cracking in a Stay Pipe Adjacent to the Ribbing.
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Figure 79. “Candy-Stripe” Appearance of Stay Pipes Due to Micro-cracking Variations at the Helically Wound
Ribbing.
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Figure 80. KTC Researcher Using a Digital Microscope Camera to Take Close-up Pictures of Micro-cracking on the
Surface of the Coextruded HDPE Pipe of a Connection Sleeve.

X 35 Magnification

Figure 81. Magnified Image of the Surface of a Coextruded HDPE Pipe Showing Microcracking. Note Coat Fines/Soils Embedded in the Micro-cracks.
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Figure 82. KTC Technician Using Hand Plane to Take Scrape Samples from the Surface of the White HDPE.

Figure 83. Surface of Coextruded HDPE Piping after Taking a Surface Scrape Sample.
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Surface of HDPE Piping
Having Micro-cracking

Micro-cracking into
the Depth of the
HDPE

Sound HDPE

Figure 84. Magnified Picture of the Surface of a Coextruded HDPE Pipe Adjacent to A Scrape
Showing the Interwoven Pattern of the Micro-cracking with Depth into Surface down to Sound
HDPE.

Figure 85. Scrape Location on Transition Pipe Showing Micro-cracking Penetration of White Coextruded HDPE Down
to the Black Base Material.
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Figure 86. Spalling of Coextruded HDPE on Surface of a Connection Sleeve.

Figure 87. FTIR Scan from Scrape Sample of White Coextruded HDPE from Connection Sleeve Pipe Exhibiting MicroCracking.
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Figure 88. FTIR Scan from Scrape Sample of White HDPE from Coupler with No Signs of Micro-Cracking.

Figure 89. A Porous Grout Sample Extracted from A Void in Connection Sleeve C19D.
87

Figure 90. Crack Width Gage Installed at Butt-Weld Crack at a Reducer.

Figure 91. Drill with Rasp Bit Being Used to Create Bevel in a Butt-Weld Crack Prior to Plastic Welding.
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Figure 92. Weld Repair of Crack in Reducer at Stay Cable B23D.

Figure 93. Completed Weld Repair in a Previously Cracked Reducer.
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Figure 94. Failed Repair Weld (Ref. Figure 89) Discovered Several Months after Completion of Repair.

Figure 95. Applying Stopaq® Paste to a Seal Crack in a Reducer.
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Figure 96. Covering the Stopaq® Paste Seal with Tedlar Tape.

Figure 97. Failure of Stopaq® Paste Seal Found Several Months after the Repair.
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Figure 98. Tedlar Tape Applied over Crack in a Reducer and Reducer-Stay Pipe Gap.

Figure 99. The Application of STOPAQ® Tape to Seal the Reducer-Stay Pipe Gap and Prevent Water Intrusion into
the Grout Void.
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Figure 100. Measuring Resistance of an Electrofusion Weld at the Weld Nipples on a Coupler.

Figure 101. Broken Heating Wire of Electrofusion Weld and Missing Weld Nipples of Cracked Reducer.
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Figure 102. Re-welding HDPE Plug Cut from a Connection Sleeve at a Void Access Hole.

Figure 103. Water Leaking from Neoprene Boot at Tower Anchorage of Cable C7D (Ref. 11).
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Figure 104. Finite Element Analysis of Effect of a Grout Void to the Reducer-Stay Pipe
Area under Loading (Ref. 17).

Figure 105. Commercial Cable Wrap Used as a Spot Repair on Stay Cable B22D (Arrow).
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Figure 106. Zipper Sleeve on the US 17 Talmadge Memorial Bridge at Savannah, GA.
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8. APPENDIX 1 Description of HDPE Piping Condition States
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Condition Category 0:– No Cracking (Applies to Both Connection Sleeve Couplers and Reducers).
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Condition Category 1: Crack in Large End of HDPE Reducer.

Condition Category 2: Crack Primarily in Reducer-to-Connection Sleeve Pipe Section Butt Weld.
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Condition Category 3: Crack Primarily in Small End of Reducer.

Condition Category 4: Crack in Reducer-to-Connection Sleeve Pipe Section Butt Weld with Lateral
Displacement.
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Condition Category 5: Crack in Coupler-to-Connection Sleeve Pipe Section Butt Weld.

Condition Category 6: Crack in Coupler.
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Condition Category 7: Crack in Connection Sleeve Pipe Section.

Condition Category 8: Failure of Electrofusion Weld between Connection Sleeve Coupler and
Transition Pipe with Longitudinal Separation.
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9. APPENDIX 2 Applied Technical Services Review of HDPE
Piping Fractures at the Deck Anchorages

104

APPLIED TECHNICAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED
www.atslab.com

1000 Zane St., Louisville, KY 40210 • Ph 502-969-9930 • Fax 502-969-9943

EVALUATION OF CRACKS THROUGH HDPE PLASTIC PIPE REDUCERS AND COUPLINGS FROM THE
US-231 WILLIAM H. NATCHER BRIDGE, OWENSBORO, KY
ATS Project #226165

April 28, 2015

Prepared for:
Ted Hopwood University of Kentucky

Kentucky Transportation
Center 176 Oliver H. Raymond
Building Lexington, KY 405060281
Digitally signed by John P. Jendrzejewski,
Ph.D.
John P. Jendrzejewski,
Ph.D.,,

email=johnj@atslab.co

m,
Date: 2015.04.29 16:04:51 -04'00'

John P. Jendrzejewski, Ph.D.

Prepared by:

Senior Consultant/Failure Analyst
Digitally signed by Joseph Maciejewski
Joseph
Maciejewski,
email=jmac@atslab.com,

Reviewed by:

Date: 2015.04.29 16:45:16 -04'00'

Joseph Maciejewski, P.E.
Senior Metallurgist

This report may not be reproduced except in full without the written approval of ATS. This report represents interpretation of the results
obtained from the test specimen and is not to be construed as a guarantee or warranty of the condition of the entire material lot. If the method
used is a customer provided, non-standard test method, ATS does not assume responsibility for validation of the method.
Professional Engineers
Design • Consulting • Testing and Inspection
Members in AAFS, ACS, ASCE, AISC, ASM, ASME, ASNT, ASQC, ASTM, AWS, API, BOMA, FSCT, IAAI, IWCA, NACE, NFPA, NCSL SAI,
SAFS, BLRBAC, TAPPI, NSPE, ALSPE, DCSPE, FLSPE, GSPE, MDSPE, VSPE, PSPE

Page 1 of 40
Proprietary Document

105

APPLIED TECHNICAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED

106

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Cracks through HDPE Plastic Pipe Reducers and Couplings from the US-231
William H. Natcher Bridge, Owensboro, KY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Circumferential cracking was observed primarily in the reducers used to attach the larger diameter
pipe at the anchorage base to the smaller diameter piping. The predominant crack location and origin was
at the top of the reducer (i.e. 0º location) where the relatively sharp circumferential groove was present
where the reducer undergoes the outer diameter size transition. The cracking propagated both clockwise
and counterclockwise around the pipe, terminating at the bottom (i.e. 180º location) of the reducer. These
crack paths suggest unidirectional bending stresses in the vertical plane putting the top of the reducer in
tension and consequently propagating the crack from the top to the bottom of the reducer in both clockwise
and counterclockwise directions.
Cracking was also located in the reducer adjacent to the stay pipe butt weld. It was not possible to
determine if the crack formed primarily to axial loads, i.e. pure tension, or if tension produced by bending
was indicated since the cracks were relatively tight and stayed basically on the sample circumferential plane
around the coupling.
Circumferential cracking was identified to a lesser degree in the bottom and top couplings with
most appearing to originate at one of the holes identified as the “weld nipple” holes on top (i.e. 0º) of the
specimen. Like the reducer cracks at the pipe butt welds, it was not possible to determine if the crack
formed primarily to axial loads, i.e. pure tension, or if tension was produced by unidirectional bending.
Since the majority of the cracking was confined to the reducers while remaining failures were
present in the couplers, destructive testing of both these components is recommended to ascertain that they
meet the expected mechanical and chemical properties for this application. Lack of tensile or impact
strengths could have significantly contributed to if not being the primary cause of failure of these
components in a relatively short time in service.
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BACKGROUND & OBJECTIVE:
Photographs of high density polyethylene (HDPE) reducers, couplers and stay piping from the
bottom stay cable anchorage points from the upstream and downstream sides of the two towers of the US231 William Natcher Bridge in Owensboro, Kentucky (Figure 1) were received for evaluation.
Circumferential cracks were observed in reducers and couplers containing holes for weld nipples. A
drawing showing the stay cable anchorage piping components is presented in Figure 2. The reducer
attached the larger diameter HDPE piping to the smaller diameter HDPE piping in conjunction with the
electric fusion welded coupler. The objective of the evaluation was to determine the crack propagation
directions of the circumferential cracks present in the components by review of the photographs.

RESULTS:

Photographs for the twenty-four anchorage points on the downstream side on the Kentucky side of
Tower “B” are presented as Figures 3 through 26. Photographs showing cracks that varied to some degree
from those identified on the downstream Kentucky side of Tower “B” from the upstream Kentucky side and
from both the upstream and downstream Indiana side of Tower “C” are presented in Figures 27 through 33.
The results of the examination of the cracked HDPE components from the downstream and upstream
locations of the two towers “B” and “C” are presented in Tables 1 through 4.
Most failures were observed at the relatively sharp change in diameter of the reducer piece. All
these cracks originated at the top, i.e. 0º location, and propagated in a clockwise and counterclockwise
direction around and typically into the larger diameter portion of the reducer. Crack propagation directions
are indicated by arrows on the attached photographs when possible. The macroscopic features of the cracks
are suggestive of a progressive fatigue cracking mechanism induced by unidirectional bending stress in the
vertical plane.
A relative small number of reducer cracks were located next to the butt weld on the larger diameter
portion of the reducer. These may have been induced primarily by axial tensile stress which was
concentrated in the “heat-affected-zone” of the butt weld of the connection
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TABLE 1
Tower B (Downstream Kentucky Side Span)
Anchorage

Crack Location & Origin

Propagation Direction

B1D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B2D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B3D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B4D

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B5D

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B6D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B7D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B8D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B9D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B10D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B11D

Coupling, Top (0º), at Weld Nipple Hole

Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?)

B12D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B13D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B14D

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B15D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B16D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B17D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B18D

Coupling, Side (90º), at Weld Nipple Hole

Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?)

B19D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B20D

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B21D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B22D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B23D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B24D

No Crack Observed in Photographs
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TABLE 2
Tower B (Upstream Kentucky Side Span)
Anchorage

Crack Location & Origin

Propagation Direction

B1U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B2U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B3U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B4U

Coupler-bottom, Next to Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise)

B5U

Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B6U

Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B7U

Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B8U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B9U

Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B10U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B11U

Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B12U

No Crack Observed in Photographs

---------------------------------

B13U

No Crack Observed in Photographs

---------------------------------

B14U

No Crack Observed in Photographs

---------------------------------

B15U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B16U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B17U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B18U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

B19U

Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld/
Coupler at weld nipple

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B20U

Top Coupler into Lg. dia. pipe, Reducer in
Small dia. section

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

B21U

B23U

Bottom Coupler at weld nipple, Reducer in
Small dia. section
Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition &
Bottom Coupler at butt weld
Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition & at Lg.
dia. Butt weld

B24U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

B22U

Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise
Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise
Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise

Clockwise & Counterclockwise
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TABLE 3
Tower C (Downstream Indiana Side Span)
Anchorage

Crack Location & Origin

Propagation Direction

C1D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C2D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C3D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C4D

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

C5D

Reducer & Coupler near Butt Welds

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

C6D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C7D

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

C8D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C9D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C10D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C11D

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

C12D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise (most)

C13D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C14D

No Crack Observed in Photographs

C15D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C16D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise (most)

C17D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C18D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C19D

No Crack Observed in Photographs

C20D

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension/Shear (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

C21D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C22D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C23D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise (most)

C24D

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

---------------------------------

---------------------------------
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TABLE 4
Tower C (Upstream Indiana Side Span)
Anchorage

Crack Location & Origin

Propagation Direction

C1U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C2U

Bottom Coupler at Weld Nipple-Split

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C3U

Reducer, Top (0º), & Top Coupler LXS

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C4U

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

C5U

Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld

Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?)

C6U

Bottom Coupler at Weld Nipple

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C7U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C8U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C9U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C10U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C11U

Bottom Coupler, Origins 90º/270º

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C12U

Reducer, Top near Reducer Butt weld

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C13U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C14U

Bottom Coupler

Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?)

C15U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C16U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C17U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C18U

Reducer small end & Top Coupler

Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?)

C19U

Reducer Large end at butt weld & bottom
coupler

Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?)

C20U

Reducer Large end at butt weld & bottom
coupler

Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?)

C21U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition & Bottom
Coupler

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C22U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C23U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition & Bottom
Coupler

Clockwise & Counterclockwise

C24U

Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition

Clockwise & Counterclockwise
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Figure 1: Photograph of the US-231 William Natcher Bridge, Owensboro, KY. The arrow shows the
approximate locations of the HDPE couplings and reducers near the bottom of the cable stay bridge.
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Figure 2: Drawing identifying the Reducer (yellow colored) and Top and Bottom Couplings (gray colored) on
the HDPE piping surrounding the cables on the Natcher Bridge.
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Figure 3: B1D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 4: B2D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 5: B3D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 6: B4D: Reducer Crack Adjacent to Stay Pipe Butt Weld
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Figure 7: B5D: Reducer Crack Adjacent to Transition Pipe Butt Weld
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Figure 8: B6D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 9: B7D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 10: B8D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 11: B9D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 12: B10D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 13: B11D: Reducer Crack at Coupler Hole Used For Electro-Fusion Weld
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Figure 14:

B12D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 15:

B13D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 16:

B14D: Reducer Crack at Stay Pipe Butt Weld
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Figure 17:

B15D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 18:

B16D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 19:

B17D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 20:

B18D: Reducer Crack at Hole (90º) for Electro Fusion Weld
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Figure 21: B19D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 22:

B20D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 23:

B21D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 24:

B22D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 25:

B23D: Reducer Crack at Notch Located at Diameter Transition
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Figure 26:

B24D: Reducer to Electro Weld Coupling to Stay Pipe Views (Not Cracked)
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Figure 27: B5U: Reducer Crack at Fusion Butt Weld to Larger Diameter Pipe
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Figure 28: B20U: Top Coupler Crack at Weld Nipple Hole Propagating into and around the Reducer (Top 4
photographs) & Crack at Bottom Coupler (Bottom 2 photographs)
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Figure 29: C4D: Bottom Coupler Crack at Butt Weld to Larger Diameter Pipe (4 photographs) & Reducer
Crack at Butt Weld to Larger Diameter Pipe (Bottom 2 photographs)
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Figure 30: C2U: Bottom Coupler Crack at Nipple Hole (4 photographs) & Reducer Crack at Size Transition
Originating at the Top, i.e. 0º (Bottom 2 photographs)

142

Figure 31: C4U: Reducer Crack at Butt Weld to the Larger Diameter Pipe with Significant Vertical
Displacement
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Figure 32: C11U: Bottom Coupler Crack near Butt Weld to the Larger Diameter Pipe Crack Origins at 90º and
270º

144

Figure 33: C19U: Bottom Coupler Crack in Middle of Specimen and Reducer Crack at Butt Weld to the Larger
Diameter Pipe
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10.

APPENDIX 3 Microbac Report on Analysis of HDPE
Piping Specimens from the Natcher Bridge
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